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1. Korean Software: What’s at Stake? 
In half a century, the Republic of Korea has transformed itself from an agrarian economy 
to an industrial nation of the first order. In economic growth, standard of living, national 
literacy, and democratic governance, the ROK is a model for other countries. And in 
technology too, Korea has established itself as a world leader in semiconductors, 
telecommunications, and consumer electronics and is investing heavily in emerging 
technology areas like biotechnology and nanotechnology. 
So, why all this concern about software? Is it really necessary that Korea be a world 
leader in software technology and a major player in the global software industry? In our 
opinion, software is not optional – Korea must strive to attain a dominant position in this 
industry. There are four reasons that make continued attention to the growth of Korea’s 
software industry critical: 
1. Software in the form of information systems is a  primary competitive weapon in 
all industries (finance, retail, transportation, entertainment). Cost reduction, 
supply chain management, customer data mining – all modern business strategies 
are enabled by modern information systems. Companies and government agencies 
cannot function effectively without software – better software means better work. 
2. Software is an increasingly dominant engineering component in products ranging 
from automobiles to toys. It impacts R&D, design, engineering, manufacturing, 
and even service and support. 
3. Software itself is a major global industry. Combined annual software products and 
services revenues have reached $600B worldwide – four times the size of the 
semiconductor industry. Digital content, including video games and animation, 
adds another $100M. Furthermore, new markets for software will continue to 
emerge, including major new platforms – platforms that create enormous markets 
for new software, like the PC in the 1980s and the Internet in the 1990s. New 
markets and the fortunes they represent are created by a confluence of factors: 
new technology, plummeting costs of computing equipment, regional economic 
development, and innovative ideas about how IT can 
4. Software is the key to the knowledge economy. 
Korea cannot continue to enhance its position and 
prestige in the world economy without 
establishing itself as a serious player in the global 
software industry – becoming a provider (and 
consumer) of advanced software technology, 
products, and services. 
To illustrate the increasing importance of software to 
Korea’s economic future, consider the illustration to the 
right. It shows the increased percentage of software-based 
product functionality (vs. special purpose chips and impact people’s lives. October 2002 
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firmware) as mobile phone technology matures. Eventually, handset features and 
functionality will be changed as easily as ring tones, by downloading software on the fly.1 
Industry executives, government policy makers, academics, financial analysts, and even 
electrical engineers often overlook software in their thinking about “information 
technology” and high tech. Besides the usual difficulty of seeing a small industry emerge 
amidst large successful industries like telecommunications and consumer electronics, 
software’s visibility is handicapped by its being an intangible product and an immature 
engineering discipline. It is critical for Korea’s strategic planners, educators, and 
industrialists to have a better understanding of software and its economic importance. 
Eventually, the very best students must come to think of software as a prestigious career 
– achieving that goal will be the measure of the effectiveness of Korea’s software 
industry strategy. 
1.1. Analytic Framework and Research Methodology 
This Report presents the findings of a six-month study of the Korean software industry 
conducted in the summer of 2002. The study was commissioned by the Korean IT 
Industry Promotion Agency (KIPA, a division of the Ministry of Information and 
Communication) as an update to the authors’ 1999 Stanford University study entitled 
Software Entrepreneurism in Korea.2 The earlier study, funded by the Chong-Moon Lee 
Foundation, examined the Korean software venture community and its habitat, with the 
goal of recommending strategies for expanding Korea’s software industry. It was 
conducted after the “IMF crisis” and at the peak of the high-tech boom. It focused on 
Korea’s policies and programs aimed at stimulating entrepreneurial business activity and 
venture investment in software. 
Over the last three years, Korea has made significant progress in the growth of its 
software industry. At the same time, there have been dramatic changes in the global 
software industry. The objective of the current study is to make new and specific 
recommendations to KIPA in support of its continuing mission to promote the Korean 
software export industry and establish Korea as a major supplier of software technology 
to the world.  
Our research approach is based on the analytic framework originally developed at the 
Stanford project. During that six-year study of the global software industry, we examined 
the entire range of economic activity related to software. We studied the three countries 
that had made great strides in the previous decade as software industry powerhouses, 
India, Ireland, and Israel, and the factors that had contributed to their success. We also 
                                                 
1  From Deborah Shapely, “The Universal Cell Phone.” MIT Technology Review, April 2001, 58-62. 
2  Barr, Tessler and Miller. “Software Entrepreneurism in Korea.” Stanford University Asia/Pacific 
Research Center, December, 1999. The Stanford Computer Industry Project was funded by the Alfred P. 
Sloan Foundation, the Chong-Moon Lee Foundation, and two dozen corporate sponsors from around the 
world. Prof. William F. Miller was Director of the Stanford project. He and Prof. Edward A. Feigenbaum 
directed the software industry study. Many of the papers are now posted at www.aldo.com/papers. 
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studied the problems encountered by a number of other countries that had undertaken to 
transition their nations into a knowledge economy. As Table 1 illustrates, the successful 
national software strategies all evolved in different ways, depending on the circumstances 
of the country and the global opportunities at the time. Some were more strategic in their 
approach than others, but all three have had success. Several other countries that have set 
their sites on software exports, including Malaysia, China, Russia and Singapore, are still 
struggling to crack the export industry.3 
 
 India (started in late 1980s) 
Ireland 
(early 1970s) 
Israel 
(early 1980s) 
Resources Tens of thousands of highly 
trained, underemployed, 
English-speaking 
engineers. 
English speaking workforce; 
European location; relatively 
cheap telecom. 
State-of-the-art 
technology developed in 
military R&D projects.  
Strategic 
Goal 
Create export industry for 
job creation, foreign 
exchange earnings, 
technology self-reliance. 
Create jobs in Ireland at all 
levels. Learn the software 
industry (low capitalization 
and environmentally friendly 
vs. manufacturing jobs). 
Commercialize military 
technology; create export 
industry; employ tens of 
thousands of Russian 
immigrant programmers. 
Opportunity Shortage in US & Europe 
of low-level programmers 
created by demand for ERP 
installation, Y2K 
preparations, and e-
commerce conversion. 
Flow of US and Asian 
technology into the EU. 
Localization and support 
difficulties of MNCs in 
dealing with multi-lingual 
market. High telecom costs 
on European continent. 
Increasing demand for 
software technology, 
especially advanced 
security technology, in 
the US as networking 
became commonplace. 
Key 
Measures 
Combine on-site labor with 
offshore outsourcing 
facilities; invest in telecom 
& computing infrastructure, 
and quality reputation to 
establish credibility. 
Offer tax & other incentives 
to software MNCs to set up 
shop in Ireland. 
Create Yozma and other 
industry investment 
programs; BIRD-type 
alliance programs; 
technology parks. 
2001 Export 
Revenue 
$ 7.5B, almost entirely 
software services 
$ 8B4, almost entirely 
software products 
$ 3B, products and 
technology licensing 
Table 1. National Software Strategies. The result of the variation in their circumstances 
and goals, and of the opportunities presented at the time, is that each country has a different 
type of software industry. Export revenue represents both product and services sales. 
Sources: NASSCOM, Enterprise Ireland, and the Israeli Association of Software Houses. 
                                                 
3  Barriers to significant growth in software exports include: high piracy rates at home, small talent pool, 
lack of engineering innovation, language barriers, and difficult business & regulatory environments. If its 
regulatory barriers continue to decline, China is likely to become the next $B software exporter because 
of its enormous workforce and investment in education. 
4 This figure includes flow through from multinational software companies that have located in Ireland. 
Indigenous companies alone exported $1.3B of software in 2001. 
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The framework that evolved from our research takes into consideration all of the 
dimensions of the software industry: 
• Different types of software business activity: shrink-wrapped products, enterprise 
products, software services, embedded systems, software built in-house, and 
software-based e-services (like e-Bay and interactive games). 
• Software technology, tools and platforms, and the software development process. 
• The different kinds of talent and skill that make up software teams in different parts 
of the industry. Software is still almost entirely handcrafted. Both software 
development methodology and software education are immature engineering 
disciplines. 
• The key role of innovative startup companies in the industry, the importance of 
entrepreneurship, high-risk capital, the developmental stages of a software startup, 
and the supportive habitat supplied in industrial clusters like Silicon Valley. 
• Domestic use of advanced software and a favorable general business and regulatory 
environment as important contributors to software industry success. 
Based on this framework, we have developed the following methodology for evaluating 
the health of a nation’s software industry, the impact of government policies and 
regulations, and the effectiveness of government support programs – assessing the state 
of progress, identifying problem areas, and recommending options: 
1. Examine published data and reports from the government, industry analysts, 
research firms, and other governments. In Korea’s case, there is now a very large 
amount of data and analysis available. 
2. Review and monitor the local trade and business press for current thinking, 
known issues, and strategic directions. In addition, we track the global software 
industry for market trends and new technical developments. 
3. Interview the entire range of local practitioners and observers: entrepreneurs, 
financiers, educators at all levels, government administrators, programmers, 
CIO’s from large firms, analysts, consultants, incubator managers, and academic 
and industry researchers. We also consult with industry experts in the US and 
elsewhere on specific technical, market and policy issues. (Our list of 
interviewees is included as Appendix I.) 
4. From these interviews, we get initial insights into the specific areas of the industry 
that are problematic. We present our preliminary findings to knowledgeable 
people as early in the project as possible. The feedback about these early ideas 
often gives us great insight into the nature of the problems we see and especially 
into appropriate ways of describing and addressing those problems. 
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1.2. Summary of Observations and Recommendations 
The Republic of Korea has excellent resources to pursue a variety of opportunities in 
today’s global software industry in areas like software services export, innovative 
electronics products, digital content, and mobile business applications. New opportunities 
will continue to emerge. In the past three years, the Ministry of Information and 
Communication (MIC) and other government organizations have made tremendous 
strides in reorienting business thinking about software. Their focus and greatest success 
has been the stimulation of small entrepreneurial venture startups – the business form that 
so often is best suited for the task of bringing innovative software to market. The rise in 
entrepreneurship among young engineers, who in the past would have pursued careers in 
the big chaebols, is a dramatic, important, and surprising change over just three years or 
so. 
Of course, entrepreneurship itself is not enough to create a global software industry. We 
summarize here our findings, based on interviews and secondary research. We also 
present briefly our suggested actions in each area (!). 
Guidance and Governance of Venture Firms 
While a surprisingly large number of talented Koreans, including many young people, 
have indeed left their traditional career paths to pursue entrepreneurial ventures, 
relatively few of these software startups have evolved into moneymaking companies. We 
believe this situation can be improved, but one should keep in mind that only a very few 
software startups, in any country, are destined for global success. The experience and 
knowledge gained by the Korean software community in establishing and nurturing these 
companies are invaluable (even if many do not succeed), and in time will contribute to 
the development of a large and vibrant software export industry. 
Seed financing and incubation are readily available to new software ventures through 
both government programs and private sources. Unfortunately, there is still a relative lack 
of involvement and guidance for software startups from specialized support firms and 
advisors, early investors, and especially from the private venture capital community. 
Korean venture firms need hands-on investors and habitat support firms in order to make 
an effective transition from startup to real business with export potential. Government 
cannot do the entire job itself. 
Most Korean software entrepreneurs and investors envision a traditional path of company 
growth through sales of products and services. But this model is not appropriate for some 
software technologies, products and companies, depending on the concept, technology, 
maturity of the market, competition, company capitalization, etc. Many software 
companies create value for investors in other ways: for example, technology licensing,  
combined hardware/software products, web-based services (like e-Bay and interactive 
games), and company acquisition. 
As a result of the lack of ongoing guidance, many Korean software entrepreneurs told us 
they have no ambition to produce global companies that lead a market sector. They tend 
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not to study their market during the product conception and definition phase and do not 
seek advice from people who know about software marketing. Instead, they remain 
focused on their technology and on product development until too late. In Silicon Valley, 
it is the role of the angel investors, VCs, and other business advisors, to educate first-time 
entrepreneurs on how software companies make money, and to eliminate the non-starters 
early. 
! It is important to continue government funding of venture capital companies 
and direct grants to select venture firms. It is equally important to grow a cadre 
of knowledgeable private investors and advisors who can discriminate among 
business proposals to identify those with high potential and can help manage the 
development of firms started by novice entrepreneurs. We recommend training 
for VC’s and other advisors who can work with software startups (as coaches, 
directors, business planning consultants, entrepreneurs-in-residence, new venture 
CEOs, etc.). All investors should be encouraged to take an expanded role in 
shaping their portfolio companies and in experiential learning about the workings 
of the global software industry. We also recommend overseas experience for VCs 
as well as for government analysts and decision makers. 
! Marketing is an important area where Korean entrepreneurs need education and 
guidance. World-class innovation must be combined with world-class marketing.5 
We recommend that part of any government monies invested in venture firms be 
specifically earmarked for marketing. Marketing should involve actual contact 
with potential customers in the target market, including overseas markets for 
firms with global ambitions. 
! Corporate governance is the other key problem area for Korean venture 
companies. Business practices at many Korean venture firms reduce the interest 
of potential foreign investors, acquirers and alliance partners.6 Requiring quarterly 
Board of Directors meetings, with an experienced businessperson on the Board, 
will help first-time entrepreneurs understand what’s required. Education about the 
life cycle of software startup companies, the various ways of realizing value from 
software inventions, and the importance of mergers and acquisitions in the 
industry is also recommended for all entrepreneurs and investors. 
                                                 
5  First time, techno-entrepreneurs often think of marketing in terms of “I built it – now you go sell it!” In 
software, product conception and definition must involve input from the market at every phase – specific, 
clear insight into what customers need and what they’ve already got. For example: “Which software 
architectures and dominant infrastructure vendors must be supported by a new collaboration tool for 
insurance companies and healthcare services providers?” 
6  Among the areas of concern: control of the company; corporate governance including financial, legal and 
audit practices; qualifications of advisors; experience of management team; lack of first-hand knowledge 
of market; poor corporate communications and website; no product and project management experience; 
weak Board of Directors. 
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Marketing Korean Software in the US (And Other Markets) 
Korea’s success at stimulating software entrepreneurship has been remarkable. Total 
software exports have grown from $50 million in 1999 to $290 million in 2001.7 One area 
of noticeable progress is the software services sector (consulting, systems integration, and 
outsourced development). The large systems integrators have begun to win significant 
business in Southeast Asia, South America and elsewhere. However, software revenues 
remain small in absolute terms.8 Foreign investment in Korean software startups is also 
lagging. 
Of course, since 2000, the global software industry has been in a serious two-year slump. 
Cutbacks in enterprise IT expenditures for new initiatives have influenced almost every 
sector of the industry.9 The simultaneous “dotcom bust” was a second serious blow to the 
industry, which resulted in venture capital investment in US software startups to retreat to 
their 1998 level. Korea has certainly felt the impact of the global downturn in software, 
especially as regards sales of enterprise software to the US. 
The most important development in Korea’s global marketing efforts involves the iParks, 
originally created as offshore “incubators” in the US and other countries. These outposts 
have been reorganized as trade missions with the primary function of helping high-tech 
venture firms enter important foreign markets. By bringing in experienced local 
management, they have also become learning and training centers for startups and 
entrepreneurs who are prepared to face the reality of doing business abroad. 
! Focus efforts to support software exports solely on those firms that are 
properly prepared and financed to sell into foreign markets. Target additional 
investment, support, and promotion programs for high-potential software venture 
firms. (We discuss the characteristics of firms with global potential and offer 
suggestions for how to identify and support them in Section 3.2.) Attend to the 
needs of firms at various stages of development. 
! Expand marketing support programs like the new iPark “market enabler” 
program. Supplement iPark educational programs like the Venture Boot Camp 
with training programs in software product management and corporate 
governance, as these areas are also problematic for Korean software startups. 
General programs on "plugging into the global software community" would also 
be helpful.10 
                                                 
7 KIPA website, Overview of the Korean Software Industry, 2002 
8 In 2001, software services exports were $125 million; products $108M, digital contents $56M. From 
"Software export surges 86.4% last year," Korea Herald, March 11, 2002 
9 Of course, some areas of the industry are thriving despite the downturn: security, enterprise application 
integration, mobile applications, information retrieval, bio-informatics, etc. 
10 Techniques for improving awareness about software markets might include following the trade press and 
market analysts, effective participation in tradeshows, conferences, and web seminars, etc. 
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! Encourage more foreign acquisition of and investment in Korean software 
technology, products, talent, and companies. Not only will this help identify those 
firms with global potential, but it will also allow the business networking via 
investors and Board members which is important for software startups, especially 
in foreign markets. Participation in transnational software startups (defined in 
Section 2.2), as investors, technology contributors, software developers, or 
principal market (e.g. for broadband or mobile applications) would also be an 
excellent way to get involved with the global VC community. 
! Continuously monitor the perceived quality of Korean software offerings in 
target markets by retaining the services of local customer satisfaction research 
firms. Software quality and customer satisfaction (in both products and services) 
are essential to putting Korea on the world’s software map. 
! Focus additional efforts to penetrate the global enterprise software sector. 
Concentrating on the consumer products and games markets is tempting because 
enterprise software is a difficult segment to penetrate; it is by far the biggest and 
most complex sector of the software products industry, the most technically 
sophisticated, and has the most demanding customers. It is also uniquely 
prestigious. It is important for Korean products to become well known in this 
sector. Opportunities will present themselves in emerging niches like mobile 
enterprise applications and e-government software. 
A Supportive Habitat For Software Startups 
Silicon Valley is not just about money. It’s about vision – “changing the world.” 
Software entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley, like their predecessors in earlier eras, are driven 
by the promise of making an impact. This vision drives the teams of dozens of people in 
each of the thousands of software startups in Silicon Valley. But it’s the venture 
capitalists who decide which of those visions get a chance. Almost all of the VC’s 
decisions are based on market potential. These industry-savvy investors attend Board 
meetings to make sure their money is spent well. And at any juncture a key investor can 
“pull the plug” on future investment and end that particular vision of changing the world. 
As soon as a startup gets its first seed financing in Silicon Valley, a host of specialized 
experts and support firms are at hand to help with everything a startup might need, from 
product positioning to preparing a press release. This nexus of industry-savvy specialists, 
including the experienced venture capitalists, is what we call the habitat.  
Except for government programs and incubators, there is still little in the way of advisory 
and specialized operational support for Korean entrepreneurs and small companies. Like 
the venture capital community, this corps of seasoned advisors and professionals will 
take some time to develop. A community of private habitat support firms is also not 
emerging, in part because Korean entrepreneurs don’t yet include business activities like 
market research, collateral development, or business development in their budgets at an 
early enough point. 
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! Ensure that funds are available for second and subsequent funding rounds 
for a small group of firms with global potential. Consider making funding 
contingent upon having experienced business expertise involved in running the 
company. 
! Encourage the growth of private sector expertise in the habitat, e.g., by 
creating a fifth category of venture firm, the “venture support firm,” to promote 
the establishment of a variety of outsource and consulting services. To promote 
the use of their services by venture firms, earmark part of government venture 
funding programs for marketing budgets of the funded companies and not R&D. 
Domestic Market And Systems Integrators 
The domestic market for advanced enterprise software products is growing. Since 1999, 
there has been a dramatic increase in the number of major chaebols and banks (and 
increasingly mid-size firms) that have installed industry-standard architectures and 
applications, like ERP, CRM, and SCM.11 Because of the wider use of these modern 
enterprise software architectures, Korean innovators will be able to deploy and 
demonstrate their solutions locally, on standard enterprise platforms. This growth in the 
availability of local test beds will prove vital to the growth of the Korean software export 
business. 
! Review, revise and expand incentives (e.g. tax incentives and other programs) to 
firms of all sizes to implement standard enterprise software infrastructure and, 
where appropriate, encourage experimentation and adoption of cutting-edge 
technologies. These measures will not only stimulate the domestic software 
industry and create opportunities for software startups, but it will help ensure that 
Korean firms remain internationally competitive. Similar systems deployment 
should be encouraged in government and military organizations. 
! Create a domestic “iPark” to develop domestic marketing channels for small 
technology startups’ solutions into projects at chaebols, systems integrators, 
telecommunications firms, banks and government and military projects. 
Education and other Human Resource Issues 
Software is a talent-based industry. Korea’s capacity to become a player in the global 
software industry depends on the development and management of software talent. In 
recent years, the MIC has initiated a number of programs to support software research 
and education. Educational institutions will respond to this critical need, in their own 
time. Our greatest concern is the decrease in the number of bright young students 
                                                 
11 Enterprise Resource Planning (like SAP and Oracle), Customer Relationship Management (like Siebel 
and Oracle), and Supply Chain Management.  This class of software has been installed in most major 
global corporations, along with middleware to link them all together from companies like IBM and BEA. 
The result is a standard operational environment and data architecture in those business automation areas 
where custom-built solutions don’t offer competitive advantage. 
 Korea and the Global Software Industry 
Barr, Tessler and Miller 10 October 2002 
choosing to study software – a reflection of the general trend in Korea away from 
engineering careers (as is also the case with students in the US). 
! Move Korea towards a leadership position in software education. Experiment 
with new ways to meet industry requirements for talent. Foster autonomy and 
competition among institutions, to facilitate responsiveness to industry needs. 
Introduce competition in the form of new, professional software schools, centers 
of excellence, magnet schools, international accreditations, and foreign university 
campuses and partnership degree programs in Korea. 
! Initiate an independent, third-party assessment of software education at 
Korean universities to identify shortfalls in curriculum, faculty training, and 
graduation requirements. 
! Undertake a long-term study of labor issues specifically focused on the 
software industry, examining areas such as performance-based compensation 
and promotion systems, career tracks for software professionals, employee 
mobility, attractiveness of the profession to young people, and so on, in order to 
accelerate change and ensure that software export firms can employ globally 
competitive labor practices.  
1.3. Korea’s Path Forward 
The future of the Korean software industry will be shaped by Korea’s inherent strengths 
and advantages, of course, and by the changing shape of the software industry. We count 
its proactive and enlightened government agencies as one of the country’s strengths, but 
there are others: 
• Korea’s proximity to major markets like Japan, China, and South East Asia could 
be major factors in the ultimate shape of Korea’s software industry. 
• The domestic penetration of broadband and advanced wireless technologies might 
make Korea a center for tools and applications in important new software niches. 
The technology behind interactive games, for example, might have important 
applications in corporate training, collaboration, and knowledge management. 
• Korea’s world-class electronics industry may be the place where the most money is 
made from Korean software over the next decade. While trying to capture global 
markets for software technology, products and services, Korea must also use 
software to push its electronics industry forward. The world will soon be filled with 
an array of special purpose, radio networked, easy to use, computing devices, all 
depending on software to provide advanced, flexible, simplifying features. Again 
because of Korea’s adoption of advanced broadband and wireless technologies, the 
electronics-manufacturing sector is positioned to become a global leader in major 
new markets, as it has become in the mobile handset market. 
• Korea’s other advanced industries, like auto manufacture, steel, and finance, as well 
as government organizations, are another advantage. Information systems 
departments in large organizations are the market for some of the biggest sectors of 
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the software industry. They serve as a test bed for innovative ideas from startup 
companies. They are also the source of future entrepreneurs who know at least a 
little about their market. Korean enterprise customers look increasingly like the 
users of cutting-edge enterprise IT all over the world. 
Korea’s ability to take advantage of the opportunities that present themselves will depend 
on the experience of the people making decisions – on-the-ground experience in major 
target market niches. These decisions must be put in the hands of people who have 
worked in the industry, and preferably worked in the specific markets of interest. It will 
take time to build a cadre of investors, advisors, and specialists with the experience 
required, and some failures will likely be involved. Programs must anticipate the time 
and investment required. Metrics for institutional learning in the private-sector habitat 
should be established and policy directed at improving performance on an ongoing basis.  
1.4. Organization of this Report 
This Report is intended to give an objective perspective on progress and problems in 
bringing Korea to the forefront of the global software industry.  Our subsequent remarks 
are divided into 4 sections: 
2. Marketing Korean Software Globally. We discuss the range of ways to create 
value with software: through technology licensing, product licensing, service 
offerings, and company M&A. We also present a framework for what’s required 
to market into the US, an analysis of important trends in the global software 
industry, and SWOT analyses for Korean software in important market niches. 
3. Entrepreneurship, venture capital and habitat. In the software industry, 
innovation is key, and most innovation comes from startup companies. We 
examine the issues having to do with the identification, initial financing, and 
early-stage guidance of startups that have the potential to take innovative software 
technology to global markets. We focus on the importance of venture investors 
and support firms as advisors and gatekeepers, in the habitat. The domestic 
market for cutting-edge software is also discussed as a key element of the habitat. 
4. Education and other Human Resource Issues. Finally, we look to the source of 
all value creation in the software industry, the talent. We consider the education 
of software industry professionals, and other issues that might impact the 
availability and quality of Korea’s software workforce. 
5. Final Thoughts. We include some ideas about realistic milestones for Korea’s 
software industry in 5, 10 and 20-year timeframes. Like other countries’ software 
industries, Korea’s will evolve in a distinctive way, shaped by the resources 
available, the opportunities presented by world markets, national strengths in 
other industries, and the unique characteristics of Korean culture and psychology. 
We include as Appendix I the list of people we interviewed, to whom we are thankful. 
These interviews once again proved a rich source of understanding about the Korean 
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software industry from a range of perspectives, and they repeatedly challenged our 
thinking. 
Appendix II is an extensive bibliography of the published and on-line sources we’ve used. 
In this context, we’d like to thank our research assistants, Sabina Lee, Sunglim Kim, and 
John Song, who worked tirelessly to find gems of data in the Korean literature. 
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2. Marketing Korean Software Globally 
Many of the industry participants that we interviewed expressed the opinion that “the 
problem is marketing.” They see that Korea’s policies and programs to stimulate growth 
of the Korean software industry have been quite successful, despite the downturn in the 
global software industry. They believe that it is only the inability of these small firms to 
market abroad, especially in the US, which is holding back export revenues and deserved 
recognition for Korean software technology. 
We believe that selling software internationally is hard, and that selling into the US 
enterprise software market is especially complicated. (See Section 2.4.) The idea that 
small startups should sell into the global marketplace should be examined critically. 
Currently, few of the 5000 Korean software venture firms are at all prepared to enter the 
US market, in terms of corporate structure, available resources (including capital), 
marketing expertise, market knowledge, or product readiness. Historically, software firms 
from other countries have had the same experience. The good news is that there are 
alternatives.  
2.1. Alternative Ways to Create Value for Software 
Many foreign software companies, and many US startups, follow one of several 
alternative routes to realizing the value of their software invention, product, or solution: 
licensing the technology, licensing a product for distribution, being acquired by a US 
company, moving the company closer to the target market, creating a differentiated 
service offering, or creating a web service based on their software. We review each of 
these alternative, emphasizing the enabling circumstances for each and the implication 
for the structure and management of Korean software startups. 
Technology Licensing. Software technology is relatively inexpensive to invent. In 
contrast, the costs of productizing, testing, demonstrating, integrating with installed 
systems, and marketing can run into the tens of millions of dollars. The risks of failing to 
find a market or being replaced by another technology in the meantime are very high. For 
some technologies, there are so many possible products that starting a company around 
just one is not the best strategy to maximize returns. The obvious route for many software 
inventions is to license the technology to larger firms, or to do joint development on the 
technology with a big company, possibly a strategic investor, and then share in 
subsequent product revenues. 
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Case in Point: Trifork Technologies 
Technology licensing (OEM) vs. product development. 
Trifork Technologies is a small, mostly self-financed, Danish spinout from a 5-year old 
Java consultancy. The first Trifork product was a J2EE 1.2-compliant application server 
introduced in 2000. Its customer base was small and located primarily in Europe. The 
product struggled to compete in a highly competitive and unusual bifurcated market 
segment in which free and nearly free open source application servers such as Apache 
competed with expensive, full-featured, enterprise-ready offerings from large players 
such as IBM and BEA.  
Trifork was unable to attract the venture capital it required to develop and implement a 
global marketing strategy. When Sun released the new J2EE specifications (v1.3), Trifork 
decided to develop its new version 1.3-compliant application server specifically for the 
US OEM market. In 2002, as one of the first few developers in the world to be fully 
compliant with the new J2EE specifications, Trifork was able to secure several OEM 
deals, including a multimillion-dollar contract with a large Silicon Valley software 
company. The company is currently in the planning process for a US headquarters office. 
Product Licensing. Most software startups begin with a product idea and then a 
prototype – still, a relatively inexpensive stage. Some then proceed to market the product 
domestically. Rather then attempt to build a global company and sell their software 
directly to customers in the US, for example, they may license their software product to a 
US company that can sell it, e.g., as part of a larger product line. This method takes 
advantage of the existing, expensive sales and marketing organization of the larger 
company. Note the contrast in product licensing strategies of the following two 
companies: Seagull Software and BoldSoft. 
Case in Point: Seagull Software 
Product licensing strategy leads to HQ move and IPO. 
Founded in 1990 in the Netherlands, Seagull Software began as an ERP implementation 
services provider to Europe. In 1994 it developed a Windows GUI application for IBM 
mainframes and licensed the solution to IBM. Seagull used this significant product 
licensing deal with a major US company as its entry vehicle to the US market. The next 
year the company established headquarters in the US to be close to its licensing partner, 
and hired a US President and US VP of marketing. The new US executives transitioned 
the company to a direct sales model that was more suitable for the US market at that 
time. US revenues grew to over 65% of total corporate revenues. In 1999 Seagull made a 
successful IPO on the Amsterdam exchange, and subsequently used the funds to acquire 
two US companies. As of 2001 the US President became the worldwide CEO, having lead 
the company to a size of $40 million and a leadership position in the US as a legacy 
solutions software vendor. 
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Case in Point: BoldSoft 
Product licensing alone leads to acquisition. 
BoldSoft, established in Sweden in 1997, was a vendor of UML-based modeling tools. 
That same year it licensed its flagship product to Borland as a branded add-on bundled 
with the latter's high-end software development environment products. In contrast to 
Seagull, BoldSoft kept all of its operations in its home country, spent minimally on US 
marketing, and focused its development capacity on improving and porting its one 
product. As late as the spring of 2002, BoldSoft was still looking for venture capital to 
expand its business activities, but was unsuccessful, in spite of the fact that it had won an 
award from an American developer community for high quality. In October 2002, it sold 
its operation to Borland in an all cash transaction, and its five-person technology team 
joined Borland's Copenhagen office. 
 
Case in Point: Brokat Technologies  
Entering the US market via cross-border M&A.  
Major decisions made before thorough market analysis. 
Brokat Technologies, founded in 1994, was a German company that sold financial 
software into the European market. It received substantial venture capital and made a 
successful IPO in Germany in 1998. It then expanded rapidly into mobile commerce and 
e-banking in Europe.  
In early 2000, Brokat acquired two US companies. Based on its experience with mobile 
financial applications in Europe, management believed that it could enter the highly 
competitive American application server market with a new secure mobile application 
server offering. With mobile financial services in little demand in the US, Brokat “spent a 
great deal of money [after it made the acquisitions] trying to figure out what it should be 
selling and to whom."12 After a year of examining various marketing alternatives while it 
accumulated significant losses, Brokat was forced to sell off its two US acquisitions at a 
fraction of their original purchase price. The US failure precipitated a restructuring of 
the rest of the company and further asset sales, finally culminating in bankruptcy at the 
end of 2001. 
Postscript: In early 2002 the former management of Brokat purchased the remaining 
corporate assets and renamed the company Cambista. The new company has decided to 
focus on financial software and services for the Northern Europe and Middle Eastern 
markets. Cambista has already obtained venture capital financing. 
Strategic Acquisition. Many small software companies get acquired by a larger 
company that has the marketing power to sell the product. Large companies extend their 
product lines or update their technology through acquisition, because it is faster than 
internal development. Mostly, they look to acquire companies that already have a 
released product, reference accounts, and some presence in the marketplace, although 
                                                 
12 Mathew Downward. “Brokat Sells Off Units on the Cheap.” the451.com, August 17, 2001. 
 
 Korea and the Global Software Industry 
Barr, Tessler and Miller 16 October 2002 
pure technology acquisitions are not unheard of. Historically, about ten times as many 
venture-funded companies in the US are acquired as reach IPO.13 (These acquisitions of 
successful, operating companies are to be distinguished from “fire sales”, where the 
assets, including IP, of a defunct startup are sold off.) 
Case in Point: RelQ 
A global growth strategy -- acquisitions and alliances. 
RelQ is a Bangalore-based software validation and verification company. It originally 
focused on software testing for real-time embedded systems and for banking and 
financial applications. Its marketing strategy was to offer dedicated testing teams to 
large customers such as Intel, Citibank and Hitachi. In recent years the company 
identified and targeted two markets that it believed was high growth and would trend 
towards outsourcing quality assurance: the aerospace industry, and game software. 
In order to implement its strategy of entering the $3 billion dollar global game software 
testing market, RelQ obtained first round funding from a US venture capital firm. It used 
the funds to expand its testing operations into Europe (Ireland, Belgium) and Asia-
Pacific (Singapore, Australia), as well as to acquire a small French gaming software 
testing company. The French acquisition brought RelQ a significant European customer 
base. In 2002 it sought to obtain second-round financing and to acquire additional small 
game testing firms in the US and Japan.  
Apart from its expansion activities, RelQ has focused on entering into alliances with tool 
vendors. These strategic marketing relationships call for the tool vendors to market RelQ 
testing services along with their tools. The company has also initiated a channel partner 
program. With its new acquisition, continued technical improvements, and focused 
marketing strategies, RelQ anticipates doubling its revenues from $10 million to over $20 
million by 2003. 
Move Corporate HQ. Adequately funded small startups from other countries often start 
a company in the US and then move their headquarters there. This allows HQ decisions 
to be made near the principal market and usually makes US venture capitalists more 
interested in investing. Experienced local management is normally brought in to run the 
US company, or at least the US marketing. The firm then looks like any other US startup, 
except, perhaps, for an R&D or software development facility in the country of origin. 
(See also the discussion of “transnational software startup” below.) 
Differentiated Service Offering. Immature or incomplete enterprise solutions can often 
be the core of a differentiated service offering. While building a services business around 
a “pre-fab” product in this manner is not typically of great interest to venture investors, it 
is very common in the US and may be an appropriate strategy for some small Korean 
software companies who are prepared to field a services organization in the US. 
(However, as we will discuss in the Software Services section, there are other global 
markets in which Korean software services may be at an advantage.) 
                                                 
13 See, for example, the statistics published by Venture Economics, National Venture Capital Association, 
May, 2002. The dotcom boom temporarily increased the percentage of liquidity events that were IPO’s, 
which rose to a peak of 44% in 4Q2000. 
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Web Service Offering. While dotcom businesses are widely discredited in this post-
bubble period, some software startups’ proprietary software may best be brought to 
market as an online service. Amazon and eBay are examples of pieces of software that 
have been used to achieve great success in on-line consumer services. We anticipate 
tremendous growth in new on-line services that are designed to be used not by people 
directly, but by other programs and “intelligent agents”. We discuss these web services as 
well as the Semantic Web in Section 2.7. 
2.2. M&A in Korean Software Venture Companies 
Only a few Korean software venture companies are inclined or prepared to take 
advantage of any of the alternatives mentioned in the previous section, especially if 
merger or acquisition is involved. (In our interviews, we got informal estimates that in all 
of 2001 there were less than 20 M&As of software firms in Korea, and all were fire 
sales.) The reasons for this dearth of strategic acquisitions include the following: 
1. The entrepreneurs do not want to give up control of their company in an 
acquisition. Even more importantly, due to the tradition of tightly held and 
family-controlled businesses in Korea, both entrepreneurs and investors often 
consider M&A to be a failure mode. In software, it is not a failure mode – it is just 
another strategy for realizing the value of an invention or product. 
2. Potential acquiring companies don’t value small software companies highly (e.g., 
based on IP and overall impact on their business vs. current revenues of the 
acquired firm). Also, many large companies generate their own innovations and 
have no mechanism or tradition of acquiring innovation from outside. 
3. The startups are not “acquirable.” Reasons include clouded equity ownership or 
IP rights, or muddled financial situations.  
4. The products are not ready for market (e.g., to be licensed by a US software 
company). Korean startups are typically financed only for software development, 
and are not prepared to enter the marketplace with a “whole product” solution, 
market intelligence, sales collateral, analyst connections, reference customers, etc. 
And they usually don’t have enough money to start and grow a parent software 
company in the US. 
5. The market does not exist, or their product is not competitive, of inferior quality, 
incomplete, or in some other way inadequate or inappropriate for the US market. 
M&A is particularly important to the software industry, in part because 
of how customers use software technology. Enterprise customers, who 
account for 80% of the world’s software sales, cannot easily adopt a 
point solution. Instead, they want a full-service solution that will 
integrate with all of the other technologies and processes that are already in place in their 
organizations. They typically want a proven solution, a whole product that comes ready 
to deploy, and one that is recognized by market analysts and the trade press as a segment 
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leader. A small software venture is limited in the number of technology, product, channel, 
and services partners it can work with to bring to market the kinds of solutions and 
support enterprise customers demand. Large software companies find that acquisition of 
point solutions or technology, to add functionality or transition to a new platform or 
standard, is a faster way to keep up with rapid change. 
The alternative to M&A for a small software venture that prefers a more independent 
route into the enterprise is to grow an expensive sales and support organization very 
quickly. This hurdle is so high that only a handful of new ventures, even in the US, can 
obtain enough funding for this option (see Section 2.3). Finally, the software industry is 
unusually dynamic. In a number of cases, the only practical way for entrepreneurs and 
investors to see any return from their investment at all is to liquidate through an 
acquisition before the appeal of the company's value proposition declines in the 
marketplace. 
Few small Korean startups (or their US counterparts) are ever adequately capitalized for 
effective marketing in the US. (As discussed in the Section 1, most Korean startups in 
2002 are getting on the order of $1M in a single round of funding – not enough money to 
do even domestic marketing – and they are having difficulty finding a Series B investor. 
(See also Table 2). Instead, most Korean venture software companies spend their initial 
financing on technology development. Their hope is to find a “partner” who will handle 
the problem of marketing into the US market.  
Unfortunately, this partner model is unrealistic. In the software industry, product 
marketing starts with product conception. Marketing drives the entire product design and 
development process.14 In enterprise software, for example, through a process of “co-
invention,” early customers often have a major impact on the ultimate shape of a software 
product. Technical decisions about architecture, platforms, interfaces, user interface, and 
even technology components are all market driven. Finally, without a complete, proven 
solution and a clear idea of its market positioning and value proposition, it is unlikely that 
an appropriate partner would be interested. Korean software venture firms tend not to hire 
a marketing professional or retain a marketing consulting firm until too late in the 
evolution of their product. 
In the current down market, partnering has become even more problematic. Many larger 
companies that traditionally partnered with smaller product vendors to add functionality 
to their product line have turned to M&A or internal development instead. These same 
companies are also adding to their in-house services organization to reduce dependence 
on implementation partners.15 
                                                 
14 It is quite understandable that an inventor who has dreamt up or even built a new gizmo would have a 
“product push” vs. “market pull” orientation towards his business. In Silicon Valley, this is one of the 
many misconceptions that venture capitalists and other advisors must typically address in coaching 
entrepreneurs. 
15 US Bancorp Piper Jaffrey. “As the Pie Shrinks, the Fight to Get a Decent Slice Intensifies.” The Software 
Field Guide, October 2002 ,Volume 1, Number 33. 
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The notion of a transnational software startup is very important. This 
phenomenon, pioneered by Israeli and Taiwanese high-tech 
entrepreneurs and financiers, involves forming an international startup 
business from resources located in several countries with facilities 
located in the globally optimal location. For example, suppose an Irish software R&D lab 
invents a LAN security algorithm. They might partner with a Singaporean device 
manufacturer to design and build a portable LAN security testing device. They might get 
financing in both Singapore and New York, then move their headquarters to Washington, 
D.C., their first regional target. This goes well beyond technology licensing or reverse 
merger. We see this sophisticated arrangement as a major trend in the global software 
industry, but one that Korean venture firms might be slow to embrace until a more mature 
model of software entrepreneurship is widely adopted.  
Case in Point: Interwise 
A transnational software company. 
Interwise started as a "web-based live learning" software platform company, founded in 
Israel in 1994. After it completed its first commercial product and had several customers, 
the company obtained $3 million in first round venture capital financing in 1998 from 
Yozma and another Israeli venture firm. It used these funds, in part, to establish US 
headquarters in Silicon Valley. The company kept its R&D center in Israel. This 
headquarters move allowed it to hire senior US marketing executives to reposition the 
company appropriately for the US market. The next year, Interwise launched a new 
business model focused on corporate e-learning, published its first advertisement, and 
attended its first US trade show. As a result of its better market exposure, it won 
accolades from a trade group and a major industry analyst, GartnerGroup. 
The company also managed to attract a well-known American in the software business, 
former Lotus CEO, Jim Manzi, who became an investor and Chairman, and helped bring 
in significant additional venture capital to finance the company's global expansion and 
first acquisition. The company’s two rounds of financing totaled approximately $70 
million from an international group of investors, including large customers from Japan 
and Germany; venture capitalists from Belgium and the UK; and solution delivery 
partners in the US. 
In 2001 Interwise appointed another prominent American software figure to its Board, 
business development expert John Landry. Currently, it has positioned itself as a 
provider of "real-time enterprise communications" and appears to have the global 
customer base and financial resources to go forward until an IPO is possible. 
Our recommendations regarding strategic alternatives for realizing value from software 
innovation are the following: 
! In addition to traditional approaches involving company growth and global sales 
channels, also consider encouraging technology licensing, product licensing, and 
M&A as appropriate ways of realizing value in some stages of concept 
development. The pursuit of opportunities that leverage proprietary software 
technology through combined hardware/software product strategies, software-
based e-services, and semi-custom solutions development should also be 
promoted.  
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! Business practices at many Korean venture firms reduce the interest of potential 
foreign investors, acquirers and alliance partners (e.g. control of the company; 
corporate governance including financial, legal and audit practices; qualifications 
of advisors; inexperienced management team; lack of first-hand knowledge of 
market; poor corporate communications and website; no product and project 
management experience; weak Board of Directors). Solutions to these problems 
may take some time and involve changing attitudes about entrepreneurship, 
company control, foreign ownership, partnerships, accounting standards, and 
about software generally. Some of these attitude changes, such as better 
governance practices, can be helped along by making them prerequisites of 
receiving government financial support, or by regulation, if necessary. 
2.3. Marketing Software in the US (and Other Markets) 
Clearly, we believe that many Korean startups that achieve success in the US market in 
the near term will do so by licensing their technology or product to a US company or by 
being acquired outright. The reason is the cost and difficulty of marketing software in the 
US. Most of the Korean entrepreneurs we’ve interviewed continue to focus primarily on 
on technical innovation, with little appreciation for the creativity and innovation required 
in non-technical parts of the software product development: product management, 
marketing strategy, market research, product positioning, beta program management, 
marketing communications, partnering, release management, etc. (And, as we discuss in 
Section 3.3, they are currently not obliged to attend to these issues by advisors or 
investors.) 
In order to understand the complexity of the US software market, and thus our view that 
only the most prepared foreign software firms have success in the US, we need to look 
separately at three different classes of software: software titles (including packaged 
software and games), OEM software, and enterprise software sold to businesses, 
government agencies, and other large organizations. Software services, developing 
custom systems, is a separate category that will be addressed later in this section. 
Software Titles. The software titles business is very much like the movie or music 
recording business. Many titles get created, few get distributed, and one in one thousand 
become hits – only hits are profitable. The product is distributed as is, has no integration 
or upgrade issues, and relatively fewer support requirements. It is clear that Korea has 
great strength in the games sector, and is a world leader in the development and consumer 
acceptance of interactive games including wireless games. To penetrate the US market 
further, these companies will likely partner with US and Japanese games publishers and 
console manufacturers, and US Internet service providers, mobile telecommunications 
carriers, etc.  
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 Case in Point: NCsoft Corp 
Re-thinking their products for the US market. 
NCsoft, a leading Korean game developer, has recently formed a joint venture with 
seasoned US game experts. The goal, however, is not to sell Lineage, the world’s most 
popular on-line computer game, into the US. In fact, NCsoft tried and failed to introduce 
Lineage to US gamers in 1999. The new joint venture (with industry veterans Richard 
and Robert Garriott, legendary game developers themselves) is based in Austin Texas. It 
will develop new Internet game offerings that are specific to the US market and will 
publish third-party games on their network. The need for even established software 
companies to create new offerings specifically for the US market is an important lesson 
for software startups. 
OEM software. OEM companies develop systems that will be embedded in automobiles, 
consumer electronics, telephone handsets, airplanes, or another software product. This 
usually simplifies the marketing problem to a certain extent, since there are a small 
number of possible customers in the world (e.g., mobile phone manufacturers). 
Purchasing decisions are often made by engineering departments, which means that 
technical entrepreneurs are at less of a disadvantage when making sales presentations.  
On the other hand, extensive marketing effort is still required. There are four reasons that 
a small OEM software publisher might have trouble selling its product: 
1. There is no market for this product 
2. The product is not competitive, of poor quality, or incomplete 
3. The company is not seen as a reliable provider of technology and support 
4. The pitch is not being made to the right people. 
Technical entrepreneurs are often inclined to assume the world will want their product 
(i.e., that the market exists) and to think they know the customers’ requirements (without 
actually investigating their full requirements). They typically neglect the other market 
research required to effectively target customers, position products, sell against 
competition, and find appropriate business partners who can lend credibility and facilitate 
“getting a foot in the door” of potential customers. 
In the end, embedded software publishing is a co-engineering process, driven more by 
technical issues than by other market demands. There is, in each industry, specialist 
expertise available to help well-prepared software companies find their way into the right 
engineering groups. It is our impression that the new management at iPark Silicon Valley 
has a clear idea of how to involve market specialists in the process, as well as how to 
identify appropriate Korean vendors.  
! Focus efforts to support software exports solely on those firms that are properly 
prepared and financed to sell into foreign markets. Target additional investment, 
support, and promotion programs for high-potential software venture firms. (We 
discuss the characteristics of firms with global potential and offer suggestions for 
how to identify and support them in Section 3.2.) 
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! Encourage more foreign acquisition and investment in Korean software 
technology, products, talent, and companies. The cross-fertilization of ideas and 
learning that results will stimulate the overall software industry. 
! Consider a Malaysia-style PR program for branding Korean software. In order to 
promote Malaysia as a high-tech center, senior public officials (including Prime 
Minister Mahathir himself) travel widely to speak to business leaders and other 
market influencers and decision makers about the country’s high-tech capabilities. 
Dr. Mahathir has also organized an international Advisory Board. He attends 
every meeting himself, which motivates top industry leaders to participate. Not 
only does he get the best advice, but he also gets an unequaled opportunity to 
promote Malaysia's high-tech vision. 
2.4. Marketing Enterprise Software 
Enterprise software is by far the biggest and most complex category – about 80% of 
software sales in the US. Here too, the use of specialists market intermediaries may be 
key to Korean firms’ success, and that is a cornerstone of iPark Silicon Valley’s strategy. 
The US software market is very large and is commonly broken down in terms of a multi-
dimensional sectors, for example: 
• Geographical, e.g., Northeast, Mid Atlantic, Midwest, South, and West. 
• Product category: infrastructure, tools, applications, services 
• Industry verticals: Financial services, telecommunications, auto, other 
manufacturing, government (federal, state, local), software companies, … 
• Customer size: managed account, enterprise, SME, SOHO 
• Application categories: Database, ERP, CRM, e-commerce, middleware, tools, … 
• Hardware platform: mainframe, servers, PCs, handhelds, … 
• Software platform, e.g. application servers, Websphere, Weblogic, Apache, Sun, … 
• Operating system platform, e.g., Linux, Windows NT, Solaris, … 
While it may seem unnecessarily complicated for a small startup to approach the market 
with this fine-grain perspective, in fact, it is necessary. The resources are often 
specialized, e.g., consultants who know the East Coast telecommunications carriers’ 
CRM groups or a Midwest wireless technology tradeshow for small financial services 
firms sponsored by BEA. Progress in the US enterprise software market is expensive and 
requires hard work and assistance from marketing specialists familiar with the firms, 
technologies, channels and market influencers.16  
                                                 
16  See, for example, Sally Goodsell, The Role of Analysts in Your US Marketing Campaign, 
www.international-marketing.co.uk. 
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Table 2 illustrates the shared understanding of Silicon Valley investors and entrepreneurs 
about the stages of growth and incremental investment in enterprise-oriented US startups. 
It also shows some of the main marketing tasks at each stage. 
 
Financing 
Stage 
Requirements Before 
Moving to Next Stage 
Principal Marketing 
Activities Survivors 
Entrepreneur 
with an idea and 
a second 
mortgage 
Business plan summary, IP 
protection strategy, initial 
prototype, investor strategy 
Value proposition, elevator pitch, 
initial product description, market 
size estimates, competitor 
identification, investor 
presentation 
~1000 
$1M seed money 
from friends and 
angels 
Executive team, revenue model, 
Advisory Board, patent 
applications, beta installations, 
complete business plan 
Whole product definition, market 
strategy, product MRD, market 
and competitive analysis, 
positioning, pricing, sales 
presentations, technology and 
marketing partner strategy, beta 
site program 
~100 
Series A: $5M 
from institutional 
or strategic 
investors 
Sales team, development team, 
whole product, analysts’ upper 
right quadrant, good press, 
paying customers, hardened 
product, Board of Directors, 
reference sites 
Lead generation and qualification, 
marketing collateral, demos, 
product launch, analyst & press 
tours, partner programs, customer 
relations, user group, sales support, 
product line plan, release schedule 
~10 
Series B: $10-
20M 
Many happy customers, 
sustained growth, cover story in 
Business Week, first tier 
alliances, top 3 in market share. 
 ~5 
Series C, or 
company 
acquisition 
Sustained profitability, loyal 
customers 
 ~2 or 3 
IPO   ~1 
Table 2. Hurdles that Silicon Valley software startups must jump at each phase of 
venture financing, typical marketing tasks at each stage, and a general 
approximation of the number of startups that survive. 
Our recommendation: 
! Concentrate extra effort to penetrate the global enterprise software sector. 
Focusing on consumer products and games is tempting, because enterprise 
software is a difficult segment of software to penetrate. Enterprise software is by 
far the biggest and most complex sector of the software products industry, the 
most technically sophisticated, and has the most demanding customers. It is also 
uniquely prestigious. It is important for Korean products to become well known in 
this sector. Opportunities will present themselves in emerging niches like wireless 
devices, mobile applications, and web services. 
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2.5. Software Product Management 
The Marketing Requirements Document (MRD) mentioned in Table 2 
is a “living document” created by the product manager early in the 
software product life cycle. Good product managers spend 
considerable time keeping all members of the team focused on the 
marketing requirements and goals via this document. Typically, the MRD specifies:17 
• Business and marketing goals 
• Customer needs, market segment(s), users’ view of product functionality 
• Product requirements (whole product): features, performance, integration, 
components, standards, footprint, quality, usability, installation, DB interfaces, 
documentation, training, user support, etc. 
• Technology issues and trends: platforms, standards, installed base, … 
• Release timing, competition, strengths/weaknesses, future competition 
• Product segmentation, adoption cycle, lifecycle, roadmap 
• Market size, market share, growth strategy and forecast 
• Product positioning: value proposition, elevators pitch, feature/benefit list, sales 
points, packaging/configuration, release dates, … 
• Marketing plan: distribution strategy, collateral checklist, pricing, case studies 
(reference sites), white papers, press/analyst relations, advertising, direct marketing, 
promotions, e-marketing, trade shows, … 
• Risks, open questions, and issues that need to be followed for future decisions 
The MRD illustrates the issues and the effort involved in bringing out a software product 
in the US Market. Korean entrepreneurs and investors are not prepared for this level of 
complexity or for the level of investment required.18 Bringing software products to the US 
market without this level of marketing expertise does not make sense. Software is a 
winner-take-all business, where only the top market-share holders survive.19 Furthermore, 
market knowledge can’t be bolted onto the product as an afterthought. 
                                                 
17 See, for example, Merrill R. Chapman, The Product Marketing Handbook for Software, Third Edition, 
Aegis Resources, Killingsworth, CT., 2000. We also thank the folks at ShipShapeSolutions.com for 
specific expertise on software product management. 
18 See, for example, survey data published by the Korean Software Industry Association, March 23, 2001. 
static.sw.or.kr/stanic_detail. Often too, Korean entrepreneurs are satisfied enough with the business 
potential they see in the Korean and Japanese markets, and maybe in China – entering the US market 
seems like an overwhelming and uncomfortable proposition. 
19  Mark Blumling, Kevin A. Frick, and William F. Meehan III. “A hard turnaround for software.” 
McKinsey Quarterly, 2002 Number 3: “Software is a winner-takes-all business in which three factors—
the need for compatible technology in networked environments, high switching costs, and increasing 
returns to scale - unite to ensure that only a small number of players in most market segments survive in 
the long run.” 
Best 
Practice
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In software, marketing starts with product conception. Understanding the opportunity, 
customer requirements, market dynamics, technology standards and constraints, 
partnering possibilities and so on is as important as designing solid code and attractive 
user interfaces. Typically in enterprise software, early beta customers and systems 
integration (SI) partners have a huge impact on the shape of the final product. And, of 
course, this product design process is over-constrained – there are tradeoffs and they 
change over time. 
The software product manager drives the decision-making process of product 
implementation. Since decisions must be made quickly, often on the spot with clients and 
partners, the product manager has to have the authority to make decisions that may have 
financial and technical implications. He or she prepares the Marketing Requirements 
Document, which is maintained as the “document of record” for the product’s life.  
Because the Korean software market is less complex, and marketing in Korea is often 
relationship based, very few Korean software venture companies come to the US with a 
product manager prepared for this job. In fact, some interviewees suggested that 
experienced product managers and senior software project managers are rare in Korean 
software companies, and that many firms are still not employing standard product 
management methodologies and tools (requirements management, QA and bug list 
management, version control, code reviews, beta programs, release management, etc.) 
The value of these methodologies is not apparent until the project is quite mature and 
complex, for example, when a software product has gone through several releases and 
hundreds of customers need features and fixes of all sorts. 
One reason, we were told, for the lack of appreciation of software product management is 
that most Korean programmers are relatively young in the software publishing companies. 
Older Korean programmers, we gather, move into management, or out of software all 
together. It is not until you have experience with how things can go wrong that you 
develop an appreciation for methodologies – they do, after all, add overhead to what 
seems like a simple, straightforward programming project. We feel that the career path 
for programmers of various sorts is a key labor issue (see Section 4.3). 
Finally, a word about software quality, mentioned above. Every market has different 
expectations along several dimensions of software quality. While it is not possible for us 
to study the quality of Korean software in depth, some interviewees suggested that 
typically venture companies do not attend to quality assurance, usability, documentation, 
and so on at the level expected in most US markets. This is an area of great concern, 
because it is important to position Korea as a supplier of quality software. (It took India 
ten years to achieve this reputation starting from the “low cost” positioning.) We 
therefore make the following two recommendations: 
! Undertake a study of the level of practice in Korean software firms in the area of 
software product management. Support private training and consulting services to 
help firms improve in this area. 
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! Continuously monitor the perceived quality of Korean software offerings in target 
markets by retaining the services of local customer satisfaction research firms.  
2.6. Software Services 
In recent years, Korean systems integrators have won some business in markets like Latin 
America and Southeast Asia. These firms have used their experience on major projects in 
Korea to develop “pre-fabricated” solutions that they can then offer as part of services 
contracts. This expertise, combined with the ability to deliver solutions at lower cost than 
the big US consultancies, creates many interesting market opportunities. With some 
strategic attention to market and technology strategy, offshore services and outsourcing 
could be a significant business. It will be limited, eventually, by the availability of 
talented programmers. 
We make the following recommendations regarding the software services business: 
! Undertake marketing communications programs in specific foreign markets to 
increase awareness of the Korean software industry as a quality provider. 
Consider retaining the services of local market communications firms in those 
markets that have some experience with software branding to develop a plan for 
approaching market influencers. Increase informational and other support to 
embassy and trade missions on behalf of the software industry.  
! Consider “productizing” the Korean approach to ICT-based economic 
development and selling it into developing economies, perhaps with donor 
organization support. 20  Host summits on ICT for economies in transition to 
establish Korea as a global leader on the impact of ICT on economic development. 
! Focus special attention on helping small Korean software firms deal with the 
complexities of conducting business in China, since this is such an important but 
difficult market. Make sure that the small companies selling into China have 
adequate business and legal support in key cities – beyond the promotional efforts 
that iParks generally supply. While China is a hard market for chaebols to 
penetrate, they at least have the resources. Software SMEs and startups need 
government support on the ground in China. 
One caveat regarding software services export: software services (consulting, systems 
integration, and outsourced software development) are relatively labor intensive. If you 
look at the software industry in terms of leveraging software talent, services are at the 
low end of the scale. (The revenue per employee at a software product publisher is twice 
                                                 
20 The Indian state of Andhra Pradesh has expressed plans to market its approach to ICT development to 
other third world countries. The “Andhra Pradesh Inc” offering is expected to focus on e-government for 
poverty-level economies, and schemes for maximizing efficiencies of minimal physical infrastructures. 
The Korean approach could, for example, focus on strong telecommunications infrastructure 
development and government policies and programs designed to develop an entire knowledge economy 
over a longer term. 
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that of the typical systems integrator, and four times that of a contract programming 
shop.21) Korea must continue to increase the number of talented and trained software 
professionals available to the services export sector, or its growth will be constrained by 
(or will constrain the growth of) the publishing and embedded software sectors. 
While we feel there are threats to the software services business in the future (see the 
competitive analysis in Section 2.8), we nevertheless think that there is a good chance 
that additional regional and vertical markets will open to this business, for example: 
• Falling hardware costs, pre-fabricated solutions, and open source software 
infrastructure technologies like Linux will dramatically reduce the costs of 
automation for organizations that previously could not afford database, ERP and e-
commerce/e-government systems. 
• Specialized expertise could lead Korean SI’s into high-end systems consulting work 
in, for example, the international telecommunications industry, the “Windowless 
enterprise” market, cyber security for Chinese corporations, or e-government for SE 
Asian governments. Of course, ICT development for economies in transition, 
mentioned above, is another specialization with considerable potential. 
• Specialized niche solutions, (e.g., in mobile data/telecom systems for hospitals, 
trading, or other) could open the some of the most lucrative systems integration and 
strategic consulting markets. 
In Section 3.5, we discuss other SI-related issues and present recommendations about 
how to use the growing services sector to help along the enterprise software publishing 
companies that are trying to introduce innovative technology into Korean companies. 
2.7. The Changing Shape of the Global Software Industry 
During the last two years, the worldwide software industry has gone from its all-time 
peak of activity and value into a serious slump. Software startups have been particularly 
hard hit. The reasons for this retraction are three-fold: 
1. The speculative investment in dotcom software businesses and the consequent 
bursting of their stock market valuation bubble has created in its wake a 
reluctance to invest in new software companies. (In fact, VC investment in 
software companies is Silicon Valley has retrenched to its 1998 levels, and much 
of this money has been invested in existing portfolio companies that were unable 
to make planned public offerings on schedule.) 
2. The depressed economy in the US, the sorry state of the public stock markets, and 
the resultant dearth of initial public offerings, combined with retrenchment by 
                                                 
21 Rule of thumb estimates for annual revenue per employee are $200K for software publishers, $100K for 
typical systems integrators, $50K for contract programming shops in India, and $10K for Indian call 
centers. See Software Magazine’s Annual Software 500 (October 2002), and Shyam Malhotra. “The 
Pottery of the Indian IT Supermarket.” Dataquest India, August 5, 2002.   
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large enterprise technology companies, particularly as regards acquisitions, has 
almost completely eliminated liquidity options for venture investors. 
3. Corporate IT expenditures have been cut back dramatically, partly because of the 
general business slowdown. CEOs also argue that years of investment in Y2K 
overhauls, ERP deployment, and e-business infrastructure have left them with a 
lot of software technology that they are not fully utilizing. With some exceptions 
(see below) their new technology purchases focus on better use of technology 
they already have. 
The recovery will be even slower for the software industry than it will be for the 
economy at large. The US software industry may be approaching a critical juncture. As 
one Silicon Valley product management consultant put it, “maybe this prolonged 
downturn will force our industry to grow up.” Software is still a young engineering 
discipline. Product quality and project completion statistics are unacceptably bad across a 
broad range of market segments. Everyone agrees. But the pace of the industry for the 
last 15 years has been unrelenting, and there has been little time in most organizations to 
attend to software development methodology, re-tooling, or even workforce skills 
development. The pace has slowed down, at least for a few years. And this presents an 
unprecedented opportunity for countries like Korea to find a central role in a reconfigured 
global software industry. 
The pace of innovation. The primary opportunity is a direct result of the slower pace of 
change. As the world’s largest companies slow their rate of purchase of IT products and 
services, and Silicon Valley VCs respond by slowing their rate of investment in 
innovative software startups, the technological future becomes a bit easier to predict.  
Silicon Valley’s primary advantage as an industrial cluster stems from its ability to 
precipitate and manage a rapid rate of technical innovation. If the pace continues to slow 
down in the technology sector, the Valley’s unique methods for creating market value 
from innovation in the software industry may become less advantageous. Product and 
market risks may be reduced earlier in the product development process. As a result, 
alternative (lower cost) ways of funding innovation and market entry may be possible for 
the software venture firms. And perhaps the slow and bureaucratic R&D organizations 
found at many of the larger technology companies may now be fast enough to bring new 
software products successfully to international markets. Finally, a slower pace of 
technology adoption offers opportunities to compete based on quality and service in some 
mature segments. 
New Opportunities. New markets for software applications, tools, and infrastructure will 
emerge, even if at a somewhat slower pace, and specific opportunities are always 
identifiable. Some of them are big opportunities. New platforms, new technologies, and 
the resulting new markets create new opportunities for software developers every year. 
A new computing platform is a blank slate. Old applications have to be ported to run on 
the platform and new applications need to be created. As the cost of computing power 
continues to decrease, new applications can be brought to market that either required 
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more computing power than was widely available, or required equipment that was too 
expensive before. We see some very interesting new opportunities emerging in the next 
few years: 
• The area we feel most closely leverages Korea’s current situation is mobile 
enterprise applications, as we’ve mentioned above. Tools that enable workers in 
various industries to do their work better, possibly involving special purpose 
hardware (e.g. handhelds), could be the area that brings Korean software into the 
global spotlight. Cooperation of the telecommunications carriers and, most 
importantly, of Korean chaebols and government agencies, which have to co-invent 
these applications, is essential. 
• Linux-based enterprise applications and infrastructure software (complementing the 
open source and Windowless enterprise SI opportunities mentioned above). 
• Very low-cost wireless computing applications, for example, for education in 
undeveloped rural areas. Naturally, there are potential device/software synergies. 
• Connected computing generally – devices will get smarter and be able to link to the 
network. One can imagine all kinds of special purpose and extremely easy to use 
consumer and enterprise tools, building on Korea’s strengths in consumer 
electronics and mobile telecommunications. Embedded software is the key to 
functionality, flexibility, usability, interoperability, and security. Korea has well-
developed expertise in embedded software which can be exploited much more 
extensively. 
• Web services. The migration to Internet-based enterprise software architecture has 
begun. As this technology becomes widespread, and vendors like Microsoft, Sun 
and IBM deal with security issues, major new opportunities will emerge for 
software systems that take advantage of inter-company linkages. On-line services, 
like Salesforce.com’s hosted CRM system, will combine elements of e-commerce, 
ASP’s and Internet gaming, with complete data integration and end-to-end 
security.22 
• Security will be an increasingly important part of computing. Korea’s expertise in 
network security and in mobile communications infrastructure could imaginably be 
leveraged into important enterprise or personal solutions. 
• Finally, there are opportunities in some of the oldest parts of the software industry.  
Re-thinking business mainstays, like information retrieval or desktop productivity, 
in the light of modern hardware technology, software architecture, communications 
trends, security, quality, and market economics may lead to major innovations in 
the way existing and new markets automate these traditional tasks. The natural 
tendency to try to undercut Oracle or Microsoft products on price alone does not 
work – there is too much flexibility in their pricing and tens of thousands of person 
                                                 
22 We should mention in this context important advances in artificial intelligence software enabling the 
Semantic Web, as it is called. Cf. Barr, Tessler & Kresge. “Towards a Knowledge-Level Software 
Platform.” International Semantic Web Workshop, Stanford University, July 2001. 
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years invested in their technology. But they have weaknesses, like portability and 
quality, which could be exploited by innovative latecomers. 
The slowdown in the global software industry presents one more opportunity of a 
different nature. For the last ten years, the worldwide market for talented software 
engineers and experienced software industry professionals has been extremely tight. With 
careful planning, we think that it is now possible to utilize some of the best and brightest 
people in the industry in creative ways to help expand Koreas software export industry. 
We will return to this point, with some recommendations, in Section 4.4. 
2.8. Korea’s Competitiveness in Segments of Interest 
As we have discussed, there are many opportunities in the software industry today that 
seem approachable by Korean venture firms. We present here SWOT analyses for 
Korean firms in six software industry segments: 
1. Mobile infrastructure software for the US telecommunications market; 
2. Mobile applications for businesses and consumers (besides games); 
3. Multimedia content technology; 
4. Software services export; 
5. Packaged software; and 
6. Embedded software 
Note: The elements in all of the following SWOT's are derived from our research on 
global technology trends, interviews with Korean software venture entrepreneurs about 
their product and services offerings, and discussions with segment experts familiar with 
Korea's technology strengths and weaknesses. 
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1. Mobile infrastructure software for the US telecommunications market. By 
infrastructure, we mean tools and technology used to support wireless services as well 
as the business operations of carriers and service providers. Examples are GPS-based 
location technology and mobile payment infrastructure. 
 
Strengths 
Korean technology is in the forefront in 
mobile infrastructure innovation.23 
Leading global equipment manufacturers are 
located in Korea. 
Korean software vendors have unique 
opportunities for getting experience, since 
carriers, handset manufacturers, services 
providers, and consumers are already using 
advanced technology.24 
Weaknesses 
Korean telecommunications software vendors 
have no established reputation or credibility in 
major markets like the US (although the 
equipment manufacturers are well 
represented). 
While CDMA technology is finding broader 
acceptance in the US, some Korean 
technology may not be compatible with US 
customers’ systems. 
No Korean software company has any 
experience as a global platform vendor, 
supporting other software developers. 
Opportunities 
Because Korean technology is ahead of the 
market, there is time to find appropriate sales 
channels and establish a presence in the US. 
Working with international vendors like 
Qualcomm, Samsung, or LG, Korean venture 
firms could establish themselves as leaders in 
mobile infrastructure technology. 
Korea’s technology has the potential for being 
a major element of future wireless 
applications development environments. 
It may be possible for an adequately funded 
joint venture to buy a troubled US carrier and 
become a leader in introducing wireless 
services in the US. 
A new and large market will emerge for 
communications solutions for the home, 
office, building, and campus that integrate 
LAN, telephone, wireless, 802.11b, and 
Bluetooth mobile devices. 
Threats 
The rate of technology adoption (and product 
innovation) in the US market continues to be 
very slow. 
US telecommunications companies are weak 
and most are in difficult financial straits, 
further slowing their acquisition of new 
technology. 
Microsoft sees itself as the eventual owner of 
all platforms. Qualcomm, Nokia, Motorola, 
Sun are also vying for position. 
                                                 
23 Korea leads the world in the deployment of cutting-edge mobile technology. It is also recognized as an 
center for innovation in some underlying technologies, e.g., mobile Java and CDMA 1x- EVDO.  
24 Japanese vendors are also looking to Korea as a technology test bed. See  Ki-hong Kim. “Korea a Testing 
Ground for Japanese Tech.” The Chosun Ilbo, October 2002. 
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2. Mobile applications for businesses and consumers (besides games). The US 
market is wide open for innovative applications of wireless technology, like location-
dependent services, sales force automation, and retail transaction services. 
 
Strengths 
The advanced state of Korea’s wireless 
telecommunications industry means that the 
infrastructure and market are ready for 
deployment of new, innovative mobile 
services.25 
Foreign venture capital firms are establishing 
offices in Korea not only to look for 
investment opportunities in Korean startups, 
but also explicitly to find markets and partners 
for their portfolio companies in the mobile 
technology space.26 
Weaknesses 
Korean firms (banks, chaebols, government 
agencies) are not yet using mobile enterprise 
apps broadly, despite Korea’s technical and 
market lead in this sector.  
Opportunities 
Mobile carriers and service providers want to 
identify new applications that will increase 
the use of their infrastructure. 
We are particularly excited about the 
possibility of very-low-cost mobile devices, 
like the Encore’s Simputer and MediaSolv’s 
VillagePDA, for mass markets in developing 
countries. These are wide-open platforms for 
software infrastructure, tools and content. 
Web services architecture, now beginning to 
be deployed broadly in the US, creates a new 
platform for enterprise application integration. 
New platforms mean new opportunities. 
Threats 
Mobile services in the US are still quite 
expensive, and kilobit-based 3G rates are not 
likely to make it easy to introduce high data 
rate applications.  
Despite years of anticipation, there is very 
little use of mobile technology for non-voice 
applications in the US. Some banks are 
stopping their mobile banking services due to 
lack of interest.27 
 
                                                 
25 Andrew Weber. “Korea as Wireless Leader? This American Believes.” The Korea Herald, March 24, 
2001. 
26 “Nokia Venture Partners Opens Korean Office and Makes First Investment in Market.” Press release, 
June 10, 2002; and Barr and Tessler, Interview Notes, July 2002. 
27 Troy Wolverton. “Wells Fargo to Shutter Mobile Service.” CNet, August 20, 2002. 
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3. Multimedia content technology. This segment includes tools, applications, and 
services in segments like internet games and other on-line entertainment, wireless 
games, PC games, e-learning, e-publishing, website design, and digital animation. 
 
Strengths 
Korean technology and applications in this 
area are among the world’s leaders.  
Koreans are active consumers of this 
technology, creating a unique test bed for new 
innovations. 
Korean tool and infrastructure vendors have 
targeted markets like Japan and China with 
growing success. 
Weaknesses 
Cultural dependency of applications requires 
serious market research before export product 
development. For example,  “PC baangs” and 
interactive game rooms don’t exist in the US. 
Marketing into the entertainment, publishing, 
and ISP sectors in all countries requires 
special expertise. The marketing of tools to 
creative people requires even more 
specialized expertise. 
Opportunities 
A significant share of the digital design 
market, world over, is on the Apple platform. 
New offerings on Apple’s OS/X, a less 
crowded market, might help create awareness 
of Korean technology and establish a 
leadership position in this sector. 
Free browser plug-ins for new technology or 
new platforms (wireless browsers?) could 
open new markets and establish de facto 
standards (like Adobe PDF). 
New Internet platforms, like Nintentdo’s 
recent GameCube announcement,28 require 
new embedded technology as well as 
applications that drive sales and, preferably, 
differentiate the platform. 
Convergence of Internet, wireless, content and 
handset/PDA should create a sweet spot for 
Korean electronics firms, especially with 
breakthrough embedded, infrastructure and 
applications software. 
E-learning markets, for devices, tools and 
content, are expected to grow rapidly (e.g., 
US corporate, worldwide education, etc.). 
Other corporate market crossover products, 
including collaboration, collaborative design, 
knowledge management also have potential. 
Threats 
Low cost services providers (e.g., digital 
animation shops in India or China) may limit 
growth in services, although they may at the 
same time be a market for tools. 
Hollywood and its technology providers are 
well positioned to dominate many parts of this 
sector. 
Adobe, Macromedia and other software 
powerhouses may also be looking for low-
hanging fruit in this wide-open sector. 
(However, like Apple, they are also potential 
partners for global plays in this technology.) 
                                                 
28 “Nintendo will sell Web Game Adapter.” New York Times, August 23, 2002. Also, Anthony Brexnican. 
“Sony Unveils Online Game Service.” APonline, August 28, 2002. 
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4. Software services export, e.g., e-government, financial and manufacturing systems 
in Latin American and Southeast Asian markets. 
 
Strengths 
Korean SI’s have experience, technology, and some 
recent success stories abroad. 
Weaknesses 
No long-term track record, reputation, credibility. 
This will take some time to build. 
Limited exportable experience with cutting-edge 
solutions. Relatively limited experience working 
with Korean firms outside of own chaebols and few 
Korean SI’s are working offshore now. Limited 
exposure to foreign  bidding practices, project 
pricing, multi-vendor project management, 
alternative solutions, vendor partnerships, etc. 
No established reputation in Linux-based solutions. 
Growth may be constrained by availability of 
software labor. 
No differentiation of Korean offerings. In particular, 
Korean software labor is not low priced compared 
to India, China, …. 
Opportunities 
As a recent entry, the Korean SI’s can establish an 
image of Korea as a premier provider. 
Lower-cost software infrastructure (Linux, etc.) 
reduces the overall cost of solutions developed by 
SI’s, and thus opens markets that cannot afford 
solutions from big US consultancies. The 
“Windowless enterprise" movement may also create 
opportunities for Linux-based solutions. 
E-government is in big demand, especially in 
emerging economies. 
While to date only a limited number of projects 
have been won,29 there are a number of large 
markets that Korean SI’s could target, e.g. 
telecommunications, manufacturing, in emerging 
economies. 
Integrating hardware and consulting with software 
services (perhaps via partnerships) would position 
Korean offerings as solutions vs. contract labor – 
higher in the food chain and less vulnerable to low-
cost competition. 
Threats 
India and other low-cost software services providers 
are desperately looking for new markets. India in 
particular has 170,000 skilled programmers,30 
global connections and operations, quality 
reputation, and very low wages. 
Local offices of major international consulting/SI 
firms are also looking for business in new markets. 
They have credibility, experience, technology, and 
inside connections via consulting. 
Local services providers in target regions may get 
preferences for some types of contracts. 
                                                 
29 IT Industry Outlook of Korea 2002, KISDI, from KIPA data. 
30 Per the Nasscom website, 2002, in addition to the “almost 170,000 are working in the IT software and 
services export industry, nearly 106,000 are working in the IT-enabled services segment and over 
220,000 in user organizations.” 
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5. Packaged software, generally. 
 
Strengths 
Some stable mature packages popular in 
Korea like Haansoft HWP and Dr. Ahn’s 
Virus software. 
Expertise in Unicode & Asian localization 
Weaknesses 
Few products established outside of Korea 
No country brand recognition 
Foreign companies will have difficulty 
competing in the US in established segments 
Both SI’s and small startups have great 
difficulty turning solutions into robust 
products 
Very limited software product management 
experience 
Not enough venture capital & other support 
for high-risk global plays 
Opportunities 
Expand foreign language capabilities and go 
into other regions with non-Latin alphabets 
(e.g., Asia and the Middle East). 
ASP model – turning software into a service, 
e.g., Salesforce.com 
SW tools for telecommunications-related 
activities like transmission line planning, 
manufacturing automation, electronics 
designing & testing – niches where Korean 
firms may have an easier time establishing 
their credentials. 
Threats 
Substantial US competition  
Competition from local companies in target 
countries 
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6. Embedded software for consumer electronics and automobile manufacturers. 
We believe that software technology sourcing is likely to undergo dramatic changes 
in these markets – manufacturers will OEM an increasing amount of software 
developed by other firms.  
 
Strengths 
Korea consumer electronics and auto 
manufacturers use world class technology and 
therefore offer the kind of test-bed 
environments that venture firms need to 
develop globally competitive technology. 
Entrepreneurs with good ideas for new 
software tools and OEM technology often are 
likely to come out of jobs in these advanced 
industries. 
Korea has a track record for OEM technology 
in consumer electronics, especially mobile 
handsets. 
Weaknesses 
Lack of cooperation of large Korean 
manufacturers with venture firms in the 
development and marketing of software 
technology. 
Opportunities 
For a variety of reasons, including costs 
savings, product development speed, and 
global sourcing programs, manufacturers in 
these sectors, including world leaders like 
Sony and GM, will increasingly buy software 
technology embedded in their products rather 
than developing it themselves. 
Cooperation between Korean electronics 
firms and software venture firms in 
identifying and pursuing opportunities for 
special-purpose wireless devices and solutions 
could take Korea into a leadership position. 
Threats 
For both consumer electronics and automobile 
manufacturing industries, large software OEM 
supplier infrastructures exist in the US, 
Europe and Japan. 
Indian software firms have started to penetrate 
this market (e.g., MP3 decoder software sale 
to Sony). It is time for India to move up the 
software food chain, and markets like this are 
very attractive. 
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3. Entrepreneurship, Venture Capital, and Habitat 
The key message of the previous section is that many of the problems Korean software 
venture firms are having in their effort to market products into the US stem from 
decisions made early in company formation and product conception. 
In this section, we will examine software company formation, financing, and habitat 
support in Korea. Government efforts over the last several years have achieved a 
remarkable success in terms of changing the career ambitions of young engineers towards 
entrepreneurship and of what we would call “seed financing” of startup venture firms. 
Korea’s extensive incubation system and several government educational and 
promotional programs supply some of the nourishment needed by these seed-stage 
startups. However, private sector habitat support is still at a very low level, and neither 
the incubators nor the venture investment community has matured to the point where they 
can effectively turn these innovative startups into real businesses, much less into risk-
taking, global ventures. 
We will make recommendations about government programs, venture capital, incubation, 
and the domestic market for advanced software. First, we define the goal – identifying 
and supporting software firms with important innovations and global potential. 
3.1. Entrepreneurship and Risk 
All entrepreneurs take risks in going out on their own, whether they are starting a grocery 
store or a software company. Different models of entrepreneurship are appropriate, 
depending on their company’s potential, the resources they have versus those they require 
from outside, the rate of change of their market, and the risks they face.  
Not all software startups aspire to be global enterprises. But those entrepreneurs whose 
vision involves reaching the top of some new software category, like enterprise security 
or wireless transactions, must be well capitalized, fast moving, well managed, and global 
from the outset. This usually requires outside investors, marketing and management 
expertise (as well as technical innovation), cluster-based networking, and very high risk 
in order to get to market quickly with a new idea. 
For the past several years, the Korean government has used a statutory definition of the 
“venture firm” to distinguish a subset of the many small businesses that are started every 
year in a wide variety of industries. The legal definition of a venture firm contemplates 
high-risk: that the firm will be funded with venture capital and/or that it will engage in 
the (high-risk) creation or exploitation of intellectual property in a technology area. There 
are other expectations (communicated through support programs and other means) that 
these high-tech venture firms will also undertake the additional risk of exporting their 
products and services abroad. 
In the current business climate, however, risk aversion appears to be the distinguishing 
behavioral characteristic of many Korean entrepreneurs and investors. Minimizing risk 
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by moving slowly and cautiously is a reasonable business strategy in many contexts, 
especially in an economic downturn. Unfortunately, while software technology markets 
may have temporarily slowed down, they have historically changed very fast. This 
requires entrepreneurs and investors to commit years before the eventual outcome is clear. 
In short, it requires high-risk business and finance strategies. Slow-moving software 
development, gradual penetration of new markets, and self-funded business growth will 
not produce companies that can introduce major new software innovations into global 
markets. 
Ironically, the Korean government currently exhibits the most entrepreneurial attitude of 
all stakeholders: it fundamentally recognizes the high-risk, high-reward nature of the 
software business by steadfastly continuing to offer a broad range of supportive programs 
and policies to promote venture firm activities. Of course, there are a small number of 
venture firms and venture capitalists that are going forward in developing their businesses 
at a globally competitive pace. It behooves the government to better understand and 
identify those venture participants who accept risk, who know how to manage it, and who 
are committed to doing international business.  
3.2. Identifying Software Firms With Global Potential 
In Silicon Valley there are neither government guidelines nor formal mechanisms for 
identifying and supporting new companies with global potential. As we all have come to 
understand, in functioning technology clusters, the “certification process” consists of 
exploiting the informal habitat network to validate business ideas, develop technical 
innovations into competitive products, and eliminate the non-starters. In order to 
determine whether their new business is a viable one, the founders will seek expertise of 
every kind, both formally and informally.  
The quest for advice is one of the key processes of early stage Silicon 
Valley companies. Entrepreneurs will spend countless hours talking to 
the experts they need to establish the validity of their ideas, technologies, 
and business strategies (angel investors, venture capitalists, high-tech 
lawyers, consultants, marketing agencies, potential partners and customers, and 
prospective team members). Through this informal process, they may also locate critical 
resources like key employees, specialists and, of course, initial financing (which may be 
seed financing – enough to develop their concept into a real business plan). By the time 
the entrepreneur has described his ideas to 50 people, or 100, in various business 
specialties, he will have gathered together the knowledge, referrals, and funding that he 
needs to go forward (or he will find out that his idea is not viable and will not proceed). 
We consider this approach to be a best practice for several reasons:  
• Entrepreneurs can validate and refine their business ideas quickly and cheaply. In 
the process they begin to form an Advisory Board, should they go forward; 
• Inexperienced entrepreneurs become familiar with the tradeoffs involved in high-
risk ventures and with the rules of the game; 
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• Entrepreneurs become better acquainted with the area’s support firms and their 
particular expertise, so that they can call upon the right people as their company 
develops; 
• Investors and support firms strengthen their network with each other; and 
• All parties in the cluster (entrepreneurs and advisors) stay up-to-date on where the 
cutting edge is in terms of technologies, markets, and business innovation.  
This last point, about the institutional learning that arises out of this informal business 
validation activity, is one of the most important advantages of Silicon Valley. It is not the 
process so much as the knowledge of the various participants (about technology, market 
trends, entrepreneurship, and about the habitat itself) that makes the habitat work. 
Korean business people do significant networking of their own, of course. Yet, Korean 
entrepreneurs and venture capitalists have told us repeatedly that Korean entrepreneurs 
tend to seek out less advice, and to utilize less of the advice that they do get. Furthermore, 
tech-savvy investors, experienced entrepreneurs, and specialized software industry 
consultants are very hard to find in Korea, especially since the dotcom downturn. As 
Korea grows as a software exporter, this relative lack of use of expertise will hamper 
success. The reason is clear: a Korean company of say 10 engineers, operating in relative 
isolation, must compete against a Silicon Valley company that may appear to be of a 
similar size, but actually has a “virtual army” of dozens of experts available to it, helping 
it with every facet of its operations and strategy. This is the power of the habitat.  
By contrast, Korean software entrepreneurs might gather a rather limited amount of 
advice during the process of applying for government certification, residing at an 
incubator, or seeking institutional venture capital. Otherwise, they have much fewer 
opportunities to interact with industry-savvy people about their product concept and 
market realities, about forming and running a business, and about the tradeoffs they will 
need to consider as high-risk entrepreneurs. Perhaps the majority of Korean entrepreneurs 
have no ambition to build a $50M global business, much less become a billion-dollar 
household name. But for those who do, the lack of competent feedback during all stages 
of company formation and product conceptualization is a serious handicap. 
High-potential software startups have the technology, talent, and organizational will to 
introduce important innovations to a global market. These entrepreneurs and their 
investors must understand and be prepared to address the different types of tradeoffs 
inherent in the software industry: 
• Resources/Ownership. Software markets are very fast moving. Products can be too 
early to the market or, more often, too late. The window between when the market 
materializes and when it becomes crowded can be short. Large equity investments 
by venture capitalists allows small companies with no assets to staff up in 
engineering and marketing quickly, get to market early, and win global market 
share. Entrepreneurs in firms with global potential trade off ownership, and 
sometimes control, of the company, in order to get the necessary financing to time a 
successful market entry. 
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• Vision/Flexibility. Many entrepreneurs are driven by a vision how their technology 
is going to change the world. They usually have a very specific vision, which is, as 
often as not, wrong. As they interact with advisors and customers during product 
development and trial deployments, they recognize the need to modify or abandon 
all or part of their initial vision due to the realities of the marketplace. 
• Quality/Speed. Engineers have a natural tendency to want to get things right. 
Exactly right. Since the market imperative is speed, successful products usually 
involve some amount of compromise about features and quality in order to get to 
market in time to be competitive. Problems can be fixed and important features 
added in subsequent releases. 
• Global/Niche. It is not easy or cheap for a small company to play in global markets, 
but in some software segments there is little choice. Firms that decide to stay local 
trade off some short-term dangers and expenditures, but may later end up battling 
for their domestic market with the foreign firms they avoided competing with 
earlier. It may seem like native language interfaces or lower prices are adequate 
differentiators in the local market, but if the local market is of significant size, a 
global player generally has the resources to take it away by localizing its product, 
undercutting prices, bundling, partnering, etc. 
• Control/Team. Most entrepreneurs envision themselves at the helm of their 
enterprise, even if they have no experience (and really don’t like) business activities 
like management, finance, sales, and marketing. Having an unskilled entrepreneur 
in charge of a high-potential company is unrealistic, and many first-time Silicon 
Valley entrepreneurs find themselves moved to the CTO or Dir. of Engineer 
position. By working with a team of experienced executives, they can learn how to 
run their second startup, or how to become venture capitalists if their first company 
happens to succeed. 
• Risk/Failure. The risks involved in a high-potential startup include the technology, 
the market, the company’s execution, etc. The safe course hardly ever achieves 
global success in the software industry.  Entrepreneurs, investors, executives and 
employees must be willing to take risks and must be prepared for failure, which is 
the most likely outcome. Entrepreneurs must understand the nature of the risks the 
investors are taking, and the consequent relationship they will have. 
It is very common for technical entrepreneurs, in Silicon Valley, Korea and everywhere, 
to be focused on the importance of technical innovation. Many believe, wrongly,  (1) that 
the technology is the product; and (2) that the world will beat a path to their door to get it. 
In Korea, much of the venture support system has tended to reinforce the beliefs of these 
firms that technology is the key component for venture firm success. The truly high-
potential firms recognize, however, that what counts is sales, and that true creativity and 
innovation are required for every step along the way to making a sale: business strategy, 
product positioning, branding, packaging, promotion, pricing, distribution, partnering, 
and customer support, to name a few. They know that they are competing on the basis of 
a “whole product,” not just on its technical innovation: every member of the team is an 
important contributor. 
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firms have technology with global potential. Both groups are likely to start out with serious 
deficiencies in team composition and business knowledge. By the time Silicon Valley firms 
have acquired first round funding, however, they have typically addressed some portion of their 
business problems. They are much more likely than their Korean counterparts to have sought out 
constructive advice, added experienced business people to the team, developed a business 
strategy, and adopted more practical attitudes towards company control and liquidity events. In 
other words, Korean and SV venture firms are not so different before funding in terms of 
technology, team expertise or even business innovation. However, the influence of advisors, 
especially VC's, is profound and positive on Silicon Valley firms, making them more likely to 
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rms of both market knowledge and product innovation, entrepreneurs in high-
tial firms know that they do not have all the answers, that they must enlist experts 
et advice in many areas of the business at every stage of its development. Chairman 
g-Moon Lee calls this kind of entrepreneur a “coachable” entrepreneur. He believes 
in the end, this open-mindedness and willingness to take advice may be the one 
ty that counts most in achieving success in high tech. 
elieve that the relevant experts for helping software venture startups are available in 
a in small numbers. Their numbers and expertise will grow as the demand for their 
ledge grows. 
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Case in Point: Free-ceos.com 
Seasoned veterans coaching early-stage software startups. 
Free-ceos.com is a Korean consultancy, founded in 2000 in Seoul, and focused primarily 
on high-tech venture firms. It provides “consultations to support and help companies to 
go worldwide in the global market.” It is comprised of three executive partners and 20 
general partners, who are all seasoned business people with diverse backgrounds and 
experience in areas such as international business, venture financing, marketing research 
and strategy, sales strategy and alliances, and human resources management.  
The firm will only accept clients that it believes have good potential to be successful in 
the global market. Potential clients are screened and evaluated in the same manner as 
they are in Silicon Valley. In some cases, the firm will offer seed financing or similar 
help. To keep costs down for the clients they accept, Free-ceos.com consultants offer 
much of their advising and coaching services over the Internet or telephone. 
Free-ceos.com is an example of a fundamental resource for any robust software industry: 
it identifies and supports high potential venture firms; brings its clients into the global 
network; and functions as a vital locus of industry knowledge for the habitat as a whole. 
Government programs cannot force an entrepreneur to take advice, give up control, or 
aspire to global business objectives. However, they can provide a supportive environment 
for venture firms – an environment in which informed risk-taking, creativity and 
innovation (both technical and business) are encouraged. The following are our 
recommendations in this area: 
! At all touch points where entrepreneurs interact with the government (grants, 
certification, tax filings, etc.), seek to identify the high-potential firms so that 
appropriate intensive support can be offered. Some differentiating criteria are 
qualitative, and are related to the aspirations and attitude of the entrepreneur, such 
as self-employment goals versus risk-taking entrepreneurship; attitude toward 
failure; openness to advice; and interest in doing business abroad. Other 
differentiators are the existence of a realistic and well-informed business plan, 
showing some knowledge of the global market; an understanding of the 
implications of venture capital investment; and a willingness and ability to adhere 
to minimum business standards, such as financial reporting requirements. Include 
experienced software industry people in government committees, reviews, 
training and consulting to help identify these high-potential firms. 
! Consider breaking venture firm financial support into separate R&D and business 
development components. Marketing activities would then not take money away 
from product development. Moreover, money spent on private-sector business 
advisors will help develop the habitat in the long run. Finally, this approach 
would help communicate the importance of marketing to new entrepreneurs. 
! Focus on expanding national research and development activities in software 
technology areas in which Korea has strength and could develop a global 
reputation, including mobile infrastructure and especially, mobile enterprise 
applications.  
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! Rationalize the current suite of government programs and policies related to the 
venture industry so that all programs contribute to smooth forward progress. Since 
the various initiatives were adopted at different times with very different goals in 
mind, a rethinking of the priorities and goals with an eye towards streamlining 
would be timely.31 Consider implementing a policy of regularly scheduled reviews 
of venture-related policies and programs, as Malaysia has done, in order to avoid 
future conflicts in goals and to continuously refine and improve initiatives to keep 
pace with the dynamically changing software industry. 
! Consider a program for analysts from government agencies involved in software 
export to get first-hand experience in the global industry, since the government is 
such an important player in the current habitat. Such a program might be 
implemented as a tour of duty for key analysts and decision makers to go to an 
established software industry cluster, such as Boston or Silicon Valley, to get a 
first hand perspective of the local situation and to develop relationships with local 
expert counterparts. Perhaps even consider internships in VC firms or specialized 
marketing consultancies for analysts without previous business or educational 
experiences abroad. 
3.3. Venture Capital for High-Potential Startups 
Perhaps the most problematic area for both new software company 
formation and subsequent habitat support in Korea is venture capital. In 
addition to cash, Silicon Valley VC’s offer most, if not all, of the 
following contributions: 
• The ability to select companies with investment potential, based on experience in 
evaluating software technology, product concepts, market risks, and team members; 
• A deep understanding of software technology trends and of the target market and/or 
vertical industry, preferably based on personal managerial experience; 
• Some experience with directing a software startup, often through a successful IPO; 
• A willingness to take appropriate risks, with his or her skin in the game, and the 
courage to pull the plug on ideas whose time has passed. This usually involves 
phased funding with periodic go/no-go decision points; 
• A network of resources, e.g., temporary CEOs, industry insiders, professional 
services firms, personal contacts at potential partners and customers all over the 
                                                 
31  The possibly conflicting goals included facilitating technology transfer, nurturing venture firms, 
developing the VC industry, creating a robust software export industry, protecting investors from fraud 
and mismanaged venture firms, and protecting venture firms from unethical VC's or too much 
interference from VC's. An historical example: the regulation which prohibited venture capitalists from 
interfering with the management of portfolio companies protected venture firms from uninformed 
venture capitalists, but precluded VC's from protecting or enhancing the value of their investments, and 
inhibited the formation of valuable institutional learning about emerging industries. 
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world, and additional investors. They should also have an enthusiastic willingness 
to talk up portfolio companies to just about anyone; and 
• The time to be involved, at least attending periodic Board meetings, and the 
patience and skill needed to coach the entrepreneur as needed about all of these 
things and more. 
The Korean VC industry is still not well positioned to help software venture firms in this 
manner. While there are many more VC's active in Korea than there were in 1999, with 
generally larger funds, they are taking fewer risks. They require, for example, that 
potential portfolio companies already have some revenues or revenue possibilities in the 
very short-term. To minimize risk, they are making small first round investments in the 
software venture firms, and are not making larger, second round investments. In 2000, 
the average investment was about $1.1 million dollars in software venture firms.32 This 
state of affairs makes it quite difficult for any high-potential firm to get the attention and 
significantly larger funding it would need for a fair chance in any global emerging 
software segment. 
The lack of expertise about the software industry among Korean VC’s continues to be a 
problem. Studies confirm the conventional wisdom of the US VC industry that one of the 
key activities of venture capitalists is to separate the wheat from the chaff; i.e. to identify 
and support only the most innovative new companies. 33  While VC's undertake this 
winnowing process to ensure their own returns, they also have a highly solicitous impact 
on the industries they finance, since available funds are focused on more promising 
innovations and not wasted on endeavors whose hopes have faded. Without experienced 
people in-house to evaluate software venture firms, VC's might look for evaluation 
expertise outside the company. Unfortunately, we understand that few VC firms turn to 
specialized experts to undertake a proper software venture due diligence. The lack of in-
house expertise, the high risk associated with software ventures, and the global downturn 
in the software industry have resulted in proportionately fewer investments in software. 
Almost all Korean venture capital investments in software are in domestic companies. 
There are two consequences of so little foreign investment by Korean VC’s for the 
Korean software industry. First, not enough Korean investors are developing the 
international experience and connections they need to help their portfolio companies. 
Taiwanese VC's say that their experiences in partnering with Silicon Valley VC’s and 
sitting on the board of a high-quality startup are extremely valuable contributors to their 
success.34  
                                                 
32 Asia Venture Capital Journal, 2001 
33 Mani & Bartzokas, Institutional Support for Investment in New Technologies: the Role of Venture 
Capital Institutions in Developing Countries, UN University, 2002; and Thomas Hellmann. Venture 
Capital: the Coaches of Silicon Valley, in  Lee, et al, The Silicon Valley Edge, 2001 
34 Kenney, Hana & Tanaka, "Scattering Geese: The Venture Capital Industries of East Asia," World bank 
Report, April 2002. 
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Second, a predominantly domestic software portfolio means that any particular VC is 
probably not investing in any firms with global potential, since there are simply not that 
many domestic high-potential ventures yet in software. Thus they are unlikely to 
experience the very high returns that a successful investment in this sector can bring. Big 
wins in software, even if the ventures were foreign, would bring increased confidence, 
experience, and the returns to reinvest, perhaps next time in domestic firms. 
Unfortunately, having been largely absent from Silicon Valley to date, the Korean VC's 
who do come to investigate investment opportunities will have to be persistent in 
networking into the deal flow.35 
In general, Korean VC's still appear to have little involvement in their portfolio 
companies. Most continue to do traditional hands-off investing. Some tell us that the 
venture owner doesn't want their advice so they don't try to impose it. Others point out 
that their share of the firms is too small to warrant the time or effort involved in offering 
any substantive help. Some give lip service to Silicon Valley style active involvement, 
but the actual effort appears to be minimal.36 
Researchers have good evidence that, at least in the US, the VC's hands-on involvement 
improves a venture's chances for success.37 There are a few venture capital firms in Korea 
that appear to have both the motivation and the expertise to support their portfolio 
companies in a substantive manner.38 Most of these "Silicon Valley" style venture capital 
firms are less than three years old, have small funds, few portfolio companies, and 
therefore cannot have a large number of noteworthy successes yet. We anticipate, 
however, a success path for software similar to that experienced in Taiwan in hardware, 
where a handful of forward-thinking venture capital firms achieve early successes that 
inspire a significant wave of investment activity into that segment, creating the 
momentum to move the entire venture capital industry to a new level of expertise and 
investment. 
Looking around the world, we see that a viable domestic venture capital industry appears 
to be essential to the development of a indigenous software products industry. Ireland had 
primarily an MNC-based services export industry until Enterprise Ireland took steps in 
1993 to develop a private venture capital capability. (It now has 12 venture capital firms 
and 900 indigenous software companies producing $3 billion a year in software.)39 Israel 
too has benefited enormously in the last 10 years from the establishment of the Yozma 
program in 1993. That program, which was privatized in 1997, has now spawned a 
                                                 
35 Interview notes,  Silicon Valley VC's on the subject of Korean VC industry, 2002 
36 Interview notes with venture-capital funded Korean entrepreneurs, 2002 
37 Hellmann, op cit. 
38 These firms do more due diligence than their more traditional peers. They have substantial involvement 
in all facets of the portfolio company's business. They may even set up full incubators to maximize the 
efficiency of their support. At least some of senior people were trained abroad or worked for US VC's. 
39 Enterprise Ireland: Annual Report and Accounts, 2001. 
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community of 85 VC firms supporting an industry of more than 400 software houses with 
combined revenues of $4.2 billion.40  
In contrast, the Indian software industry has had difficulties moving away from its 
services-based roots, in part because of its lack of a meaningful domestic VC industry.41 
(While there are some foreign VC's in India, they are not inclined to fund ventures that 
will not be directed immediately to the export market.) Japan is another country whose 
VC industry has little expertise or interest in the software industry. As a result, all of the 
Japanese software services firm expertise has yet to be marshaled towards a viable 
software export industry.42 
Korea's software industry has progressed well so far with the help of significant ongoing 
support from government programs and in addition, much government involvement in the 
venture capital industry. The establishment of new public venture capital firms in recent 
years, such as Korea Venture Fund and Dasan Venture, have certainly been helpful for 
high-tech startups under three years old. It might seem reasonable then to believe that the 
software industry can continue to grow long-term without a better-developed private VC 
industry.  
As a practical matter, however, government programs or even government-backed 
venture firms cannot do the whole job. A government agency, for example, would be 
hard-pressed to develop the depths of expertise or the breadth of international 
relationships that a private venture capital firm can, and therefore it cannot hope to give 
the required specialized attention to each individual promising venture startup.  On the 
flip side, the government can rarely shut down the non-performers to preserve finite 
financial resources with the same pragmatic efficiency as a private investor. Effort must 
continue to be focused on developing the private VC industry as a key driver for the long-
term growth of the software industry. 
Our recommendations: 
! Make government funding programs to venture capital firms contingent on 
performance. Reorient incentives and programs for the venture capital community 
to encourage them to take an expanded role in shaping their portfolio companies 
and in experiential learning about the workings of the global software industry. 
Growing a cadre of knowledgeable private investors/advisors will take some time, 
but it is critical to the long-term development of the software export industry. 
! Ensure that there are funds available to provide second and subsequent rounds of 
equity financing to firms with high potential but that need more investment before 
                                                 
40 Israeli Association of Software Houses, http://www.iash.org.il/Content/SoftwareInds/SoftwareInds.asp, 
October 2002 
41 Rafiq Dossani and Martin Kenney. "Creating an Environment for Venture Capital in India." World 
Development, Vol. 30, No. 2, 2002. 
42 Kenney, Hana & Tanaka, op cit. 
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achieving profitability. Much of the current VC interest in and funding of 
software venture firms is focused on seed or first-round investments, potentially 
leaving a number of worthy firms unable to progress after their initial funding.  
! For startups that apply for government support beyond the seed-financing stage, 
consider making further funding (especially for technical entrepreneurs and new 
graduates) contingent upon obtaining substantive and on-going business expertise 
such as business experts in senior management or business advisory boards. The 
management team should have experience in business generally, and better yet, in 
the software industry, in the specific vertical industry they’re targeting, and 
possibly in the US (or their target geographical market). 
! Give incentives and training on proper corporate governance practices to VC’s 
and other advisors who can work with software startups (as coaches, directors, 
business planning consultants, entrepreneurs-in-residence, new venture CEOs, 
etc.). 
! For any ventures receiving government-funded grants, loans, or investments, 
require regular Board of Director meetings and quarterly status reviews by 
investors. Financial reporting is an important tool for management as well as a 
mechanism for building trust in the industry. The Board should have outside 
Directors – people with expertise and experience – and be responsible for keeping 
management focused on the business plan, or understanding why it needs to be 
revised. There is no intention here to burden small companies with paperwork or 
useless administrative overhead, but rather to be in a better position to get help 
from interested stakeholders.  
! Encourage more Korean VC’s to participate in Silicon Valley and other high-tech 
clusters, to learn from VC’s with more experience in the global software industry. 
Industry expertise and interaction with the international VC community have 
proven crucial to the successful development of the venture capital industries of 
Taiwan and Israel. To encourage the Korean VC community to develop its 
international network as well as to enhance Korean expertise and knowledge of 
cutting-edge venture capital investment strategies, develop targeted matching-
funds investment programs or incentive programs for investing in foreign 
ventures that would benefit Korea in the broadest sense. Review venture capital-
related regulation to ensure that there are no administrative, tax, or other 
impediments that might discourage Korean VC’s from investing abroad or foreign 
VCs from investing in Korea. 
! Review current tax incentives to both venture fund investors and the venture 
capital industry to ensure that they motivate the desired investment behavior. For 
example, it would be useful to examine the impact of the current approach of 
providing a significant tax break up-front to fund investors, who enjoy this benefit 
even if the receiving venture fund avoids risk by investing little or none of these 
monies. 
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3.4. Habitat Support for High-Potential Software Venture Firms 
Habitat support for software venture startups is not completely absent from the Korean 
business landscape. Over the last few years, Korean business incubators have grown 
substantially in number and in the range of services they offer. At the present time there 
are more than 300 incubators in Korea, plus about 150 industrial complexes that are also 
providing incubation space and services. This makes Korea’s system of incubators one of 
the most extensive in the world and more than adequate to handle the number of venture 
firms (currently around 10,000). 
Incubators, however, do not meet all the needs of Korea’s venture firms. They are not a 
substitute for a thriving private sector habitat. Not all startups go into an incubator, and 
the ones that do are allowed a maximum stay of only two or so years. More importantly, 
almost all incubators focus on technical and logistical support (office space, PCs, Internet 
bandwidth, etc.) and not on the broad business support that is so desperately needed. 
A 1999 Science and Technology Policy Institute (STEPI) study reported that Korean 
business incubators at that time provided little more than office space to tenant 
companies. The most often offered additional support was technical. 43  A National 
Business Incubator Association report from about the same time period showed that 
successful US incubators provided a large array of support services ranging from 
management to legal.44 While we understand that Korean incubators are now offering a 
broader array of services, particularly marketing help, the task now is to refine the service 
offerings and focus particularly on the venture firms with high potential. 
The majority of Korean incubators are particularly challenged because their management 
has little incubation or even business experience. Many are professors, researchers or 
government employees. This observation is especially true for the not-for-profit 
incubators. It is quite difficult for these managers to find and tap into a powerful network 
of support for their tenants, or to help with the full range of business needs. 
While no definitive studies have been done on how incubators might 
improve the success rates of high-tech startups, some recent studies of 
technology incubators in the US and Europe can offer a list of practices 
that have a high probability of success in creating companies that can 
survive and obtain funding for further growth.45 These likely success factors are also what 
most Silicon Valley incubator managers would agree were best practices:46 
                                                 
43 Cited in Zong-Tae Bae, Business Incubation in Korea, slides, SPRIE Incubation Research Workshop, 
Feb 2002. 
44 National Business Incubator Association, Impacts of Incubator Investments, 1997 
45Albert & Gaynor, Incubators -- Growing Up, Moving Out: A Review of the Literature, 2001; and Lewis, 
David, Does Technology Incubation Work? A Critical Review, Rutgers University, 2001 
46  UN-ECE, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Expert Meeting on Best Practice in Business 
Incubation, Geneva, 1999. 
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• Positive relationships with the local “technology generators” i.e. universities, 
research labs, and dynamic companies; 
• Full-time, experienced, entrepreneurial incubator management; 
• High-quality tenants; 
• Broad range of business support services, such as accounting, legal and marketing; 
• Access to a strong business network, including specialized business support, 
potential customers and partners; 
• Good physical infrastructure and equipment. 
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KoreaFigure 2. A qualitative comparison of Korean and Silicon Valley incubators based on 
interviews and available data. The comparison is across six important best practices areas 
articulated by experts of the US National Incubator Association and the United Nations. In terms 
of physical facilities and proximity to technology generating organizations, such as universities, 
research labs, and companies, both Korean and Silicon Valley incubators are roughly comparable, 
although the latter has access to considerably more technology generators. Regarding tenant 
quality, many Silicon Valley for-profit incubators have closed down, and the remaining incubators 
are increasingly selective in their choice of tenant companies. In contrast, the substantial increase 
in the number of Korean incubators and incubation facilities in industrial complexes in proportion 
to the number of venture firms cannot help but keep entry standards modest, leading to a 
somewhat lower tenant quality. Business support services in Korean incubators have improved 
considerably since 1999, but there are still noticeable gaps in the range of services that the 
majority can offer either in-house or brought in from outside. Networking opportunities and 
linkages to important potential business partners, beta customers, and so on, have been slow to 
improve in Korean incubators, which may be partially the result of the general business downturn. , Tessler and Miller 49 October 2002 
addition to providing some useful support for venture firms, the current Korean 
bator system offers additional business and social benefits, including facilitating and 
easing the amount of market-oriented R&D available for business exploitation; 
ulating regional/local economic development; education; technology transfer; and 
ort-oriented business development. Government programs that fund incubators should 
e clarity about the various goals, since they will sometimes conflict, and about what 
stitutes successful outcomes for each type of incubator. For example, government 
grams that fund university incubators would aim to enhance advanced technology 
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education and facilitate technology transfer, but would not expect to spawn a significant 
number of firms with global potential. Similarly, the performance of the majority of non-
university, not-for-profit incubators is measured on the basis of contribution to local 
economic development (diversify industries, generate tax revenue, and employ people).  
While many Korean incubators do have as their primary goal the development of venture 
firms with export potential, very few incubators are currently optimized to nurture the 
high-potential types of firms. Incubators most able to support firms with global potential, 
whether they are for-profit incubators or not, are likely to be very entrepreneurial and are 
run more like businesses. 
Case in Point: The Enterprise Network (TEN) 
A famous and successful Silicon Valley incubator. 
The Enterprise Network (TEN) is a Silicon Valley high-tech incubator founded in 1993 
and currently serving 38 companies. It is a general-purpose incubator committed to 
employing best practices.  
One key TEN incubator best practice has been its constant drive to expand its network in 
the local habitat. It maintains regular contacts with the dozens of technology-generating 
organizations in the area (university, government labs, and high-tech companies), in 
order keep up-to-date on the cutting-edge of innovation, as well as to obtain the highest 
quality tenants. 
A second key best practice is the incubator's steady focus on creating viable businesses, 
rather than on technology. The six full-time TEN staff consists of a powerful combination 
of three seasoned entrepreneurs and three experienced business people from the 
community, (including one technical person). A Board of Directors and a large, well-
connected Advisory Board support their efforts. The 16-member Board of Directors 
includes a former TEN executive director, the dean of a local business school, a 
marketing consultant, three venture law specialists, two accounting experts, two venture 
capitalists, three successful entrepreneurs, and an executive search professional. The 15-
member Advisory Board includes specialists with specific expertise in areas ranging from 
international business development to startup marketing to business strategy. Many of the 
Boards' members are non-US-natives who can also offer contacts and focused advice for 
doing business abroad. The staff and Boards of the incubator are additionally supported 
by 25 sponsors and partners: the three technology partners are joined by 22 service 
providers in venture finance, law and marketing.  
In the past five years, TEN has graduated approximately 80 companies, including several 
that were successfully acquired by companies such as Intel, and at least one big 
successful public company, eBay. 
Incubators continue to play an important role in the very early developmental stages of 
Korea’s software venture firms. However, they can only be a part of the habitat, and 
cannot substitute for a thriving open market of independent advisors, consultants and 
services firms whose business is supporting startup ventures at every stage: 
• Like the incubators, the habitat makes knowledge and services available to very 
small firms who need different kinds of expert help from time to time (usually on 
short notice), but can’t justify hiring full-time people with the required know-how. 
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• Entrepreneurs can get exactly the support they need from an open-market habitat 
(market research, business strategy, collateral development, UI design, product 
documentation, etc.). Paying for these services, once they are finally convinced they 
need them, may make first-time entrepreneurs more likely to appreciate the value of 
those contributions. 
• An open-market habitat is a very efficient way to utilize expertise that is in short 
supply. On the one hand, scarce expertise can demand high fees, meaning that only 
the most serious firms will want their services. On the other hand, the habitat 
experts themselves only take on the firms that they believe have good potential. 
Thus, just like the venture capitalists, they act as a filter, expending energy on only 
the most promising new startups.  
• An open-market habitat is also an efficient way to train new talent for highly 
specialized support firms. The better services firms hire more employees, who learn 
the business and eventually spin off their own services firms. Mobility of talent is a 
key feature of effective technology clusters. (Hollywood film production comes to 
mind as another cluster where highly specialized talent is brought together for each 
specific project.) 
• The rapid institutional learning about new technology, new markets, and new ideas 
that is shared in the open-market habitat is a result of the business motivation of the 
individual participants who are rewarded based on their effectiveness and reputation. 
The habitat is a cooperative environment – everyone has a stake in the companies 
and industry they serves. 
• The open-market structure can more easily support the transnational software 
startup (described in Section 2.1), since resources are available generally to any part 
of the transnational firm that happens to be located locally. 
Our recommendations for improving the effectiveness of the incubators and building 
additional habitat support capabilities, especially for post-incubation and GSI startup 
firms: 
! Adhere to performance-based funding principles for existing public and private 
business incubators, recognizing the possibility that some of the operations will 
not survive. Expand incubator performance measures, especially with regard to 
high potential software ventures, to include acceptable progress in transitioning to 
the next stage of business development (but not necessarily generating revenues), 
such as obtaining beta customers; entering into joint development arrangements or 
marketing alliances; or obtaining private venture capital.   
! Offer an increased level of funding for business services and advice in the 
supported incubators. For example, creating a pool of experienced advisors who 
are available to the incubators (for committees, proposal reviews, and/or periodic 
visits) might be a way to increase the speed of learning about entrepreneurship 
and about the software industry. 
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! Expand marketing support programs like the new iPark “market enabler” program. 
Supplement iPark educational programs like the Venture Boot Camp with training 
programs in software product management and corporate governance, as these 
areas are also problematic for Korean software startups (see Section 2.5). General 
programs on "plugging into the global software community" would also be 
helpful. (Techniques for improving awareness about software markets might 
include following the trade press and market analysts, effective participation in 
tradeshows, conferences, and web seminars, etc.)  
! Attend to the needs of firms at various stages of development. In particular, 
increased focus is needed on post-incubation firms that have several million 
dollars of post-seed investment, a dozen or more employees, and international 
business activities. 
! Encourage the growth of private sector expertise in the habitat by creating a fifth 
category of venture firm, the “venture support firm,” to promote the establishment 
of a variety of outsource and consulting services. Venture support firms would be 
eligible for some of the same incentives available to the software startups they 
serve (such as tax breaks in the early years). Examples: private QA service 
centers; specialized temporary staffing firms; software market research and 
strategy consultancies; private incubators; specialized ad agencies and PR firms; 
documentation and tech writing services; tech support call center outsourcing; 
specialized law firms; and technology licensing and commercialization firms. 
! To encourage the use of habitat services by venture firms, differentiate R&D 
funds from business development funds in government venture funding programs. 
This will stimulate both the hiring of marketing professionals by venture 
companies and flow-through of money to specialists in the open-market habitat. 
! Continue to evolve the mission of the recently organized national QA lab. It is 
expanding its role currently as a testing and certification service center for 
software companies. We believe that private testing firms should eventually take 
over this role and that the government lab should develop programs for 
encouraging and supporting private testing labs (as a certifier of private labs, 
establisher of standards, certifier for government procurement, and investigator of 
different countries’ standards). Private outsourcers (or in-house departments of 
larger software companies) will be in a better position to test software products to 
the level of detail necessary to compete abroad: test on all hardware platforms, on 
all versions of operating systems, interfacing to the database, ERP, and 
middleware products from major vendors, and so on. Private firms would also be 
able to test more dimensions of quality, including functionality, reliability, 
usability, installation, performance, and documentation. 47 
                                                 
47 While one might suppose that a government “seal of approval” for Korean software products would be 
beneficial, we think that it is too early for that step and that there would be risks of compromising the 
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3.5. Stimulating Domestic Demand 
One final dimension of the habitat we need to address is the domestic market for 
advanced software technology. As we have pointed out earlier, there has been dramatic 
improvement in the use of software technology by Korea’s largest manufacturing firms 
and financial institutions. This is a very positive development for Korea generally.48 
However, there is still insufficient use of advanced software technology. The 
environments where innovations can be tried are beginning to appear in the large firms: 
standard ERP databases, e-commerce, wireless applications, etc. But Korean firms are 
not yet to the point of innovating on these platform and using cutting-edge products from 
startup companies. Software startups, in turn, still do not have a domestic market. This 
situation puts these firms at a disadvantage in terms of: product requirements evolution, 
product testing in operational environments, and, most importantly, the credibility that 
comes from having major firms as customers and references. 
Some suggestions: 
! Stimulate domestic demand for innovative software solutions with global 
potential, built on standard enterprise architectures. In particular, create a 
domestic “iPark” to develop domestic marketing channels for technology 
startups’ solutions into projects at chaebols, systems integrators, 
telecommunications firms, government projects, and banks. 
! Review, revise and expand incentives (e.g. tax incentives and other programs) to 
firms of all sizes to implement standard enterprise software infrastructure and, 
where appropriate, encourage experimentation and adoption of cutting-edge 
technologies. These measures will not only stimulate the domestic software 
industry and create opportunities for software startups, but it will help ensure that 
Korean firms remain internationally competitive. 
! Encourage all government agencies, including the military, to continue to update 
systems for record keeping, operations, and services (e-government) using world-
class software infrastructure components (SAP, Oracle, Microsoft, Linux, IBM, 
BEA, Java, and others). Conduct high-level workshops for top government 
officials and corporate executives to enable them to be leaders in introducing 
innovative IT in their organizations. Encourage development of advanced projects 
using state-of-the-art technology, including cutting-edge Korean technology (e.g., 
mobile enterprise applications) that meet international standards of quality. 
Include projects that can be re-sold by systems integrators into target markets (SE 
                                                                                                                                                 
“Korea” brand. We recommend that certification be done by independent, private organizations to the 
satisfaction of the software publishers, and that the Korea brand be established separately. 
48 “No nation can be strong industrially without strength in software.” – William F. Miller, Stanford 
University, 2002. 
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Asia, China, Japan, Latin America, Europe), using the Korean government’s 
system as a reference site. Encourage cross-fertilization of knowledge among SI’s, 
e.g., through consortia projects. 
! Continue education and enforcement programs regarding software piracy. 
Persistence will offer further benefits for the consumer software industry as public 
attitudes towards software gradually change. 
In addition, there is a problematic issue in the Korean software services sector that stems 
from its historical origin and the overall structure of Korean industry. All of the large 
systems integration firms are captive to a chaebol. While they can get some useful 
domestic experience from government projects and from work within their own 
conglomerate, their experience with other firms is limited and the cross-fertilization of 
knowledge about installed technology is low compared to their international competitors. 
Resistance to outsourcing by in-house software groups and labor unions at banks and 
other non-chaebol institutions, along with customer preferences for foreign SI firms vs. 
those from competing chaebols, further reduces the exposure of Korea’s big systems 
integrators to needed experience and state-of-the-art technology. 
! The government should encourage the cross-fertilization of knowledge among the 
SIs by, for example, continuing to require that multiple SI’s form consortia to take 
on major government projects. Perhaps this model could be extended to smaller 
projects and some non-government projects. 
! Educate in-house software teams and IT labor unions about the tremendously 
positive impact that outsourcing has had on similar professionals in the US to 
create a more positive attitude toward software services outsourcing. 
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4. Education and other Human Resource Issues 
Value creation in the software industry, in all sectors, is dependent on the talent and skills 
of a variety of software professionals. Korea has instituted many programs over the years 
to increase the quantity and quality of graduates prepared for software careers. In our 
1999 report, we took a close look at Korea’s software education resources, policies, and 
practices. The major issue at that time, besides overall capacity to produce qualified 
graduates, was a troubling trend towards merging Computer Science departments into the 
larger and more dominant Electrical and Mechanical Engineering programs in order to 
qualify for Brain Korea 21 funds. These changes occurred at a time when software 
studies needed more attention, funding and autonomy, rather than less.  
Although tangible forward progress has been slow, we believe that both momentum and 
support for improved software training has increased substantially as a result of several 
educational initiatives. A number of interesting programs have been funded and are in the 
first years of implementation, including: 
• New program to train graduate-level engineers abroad in CMU's certificate program 
at NASA Ames 
• Initiative to recruit lecturers from industry to teach entry-level programming 
• Foreign visiting faculty programs 
• Programs to promote applied research for industry needs 
• New university initiatives emphasizing software studies 
In addition, there are some signs of progress and good directions going forward: 
• Many creative proposals put forth for interdisciplinary programs in software and 
management, or in MIS and industrial engineering, for example 
• Management courses under development for engineers (KAIST) 
• Creative ideas for a professional software school as well as for a media laboratory 
modeled after the MIT Media Lab (KAIST and ICU) 
• Budgets for more software-focused Computer Science faculty 
• Demand from foreign students, especially from China, to study Computer Science 
in Korea  
We believe that these programs and trends will eventually contribute to substantial 
improvements in software education in Korea. Some problem areas have emerged, 
however. First, Computer Science enrollments are down. The consensus opinion 
regarding the decline is that, in a growing economy, students have good opportunities in a 
variety of professional fields. Since students believe that the training and the work is 
harder in software than in other disciplines, they are choosing other majors. A temporary 
decline in the rate of demand for software professionals, caused by the transition of 
people who had been working for dotcom startups and by the general slowdown in the 
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global software industry, may also be decreasing the perceived value of a software 
degree.49 
The second problem area is that the pace of change in software education continues to be 
very slow. Some schools have created separate software programs in name, but have so 
far not been able to implement substantive improvements in their curricula or faculty 
composition. We first address this general issue of software education and the university 
system, and then focus on improving the quality of graduates from current programs. The 
global supply of software talent and other non-education HR issues are addressed in the 
subsequent sections. 
4.1. Software Education at Korean Universities 
Universities are slowly changing institutions. Thoughtful academics consider the 
university’s “disengaged” stance and deliberate pace to be a feature. However, this 
institutional inertia sometimes makes it difficult to meet society’s educational needs, 
especially in situations where needs and knowledge are changing rapidly. 
There is also an inherent conflict in the universities in Korea, and in all countries, about 
how to train software professionals. We would like our schools to produce all of the 
following in adequate numbers:  
• The next generation of teachers of all software-related subjects at all levels  
• Cutting edge-researchers who know the most recent theoretical developments, 
technologies and tools, at least in some sub-discipline of Computer Science (some 
innovative business ideas come from this group, as do many software architects) 
• Programmers of all sorts, filling industry’s need for trained technical professionals. 
For most software projects, a few top software architects and designers drive the 
work of a much larger number of journeyman and novice programmers. These top 
programmers are typically Computer Science graduates. At the other end of the 
spectrum might be testers and QA technicians, positions often filled by trainees.50 
• Software managers (project managers, product managers, and program managers). 
Next to top-flight software architects, people who combine technical skills (who 
understand tradeoffs and complexities), people skills, and business sensibilities are 
the most hard-to-find class of talent, and key to success in all major projects.  
                                                 
49 While Korean employment in the software and computer services sector grew an average of 16.1% per 
year from 1996-2000, it appears to have not increased appreciably by 2Q2001, the last quarter for which 
data is available. [Source: Korea Association of Information and Telecommunication, 2002].  
50 It is important to keep in mind that the difference in top programmers and average programmers is 
significant. Top programmers have natural talent, in addition to their CS training and extensive 
experience with various tools and technologies. Education and training alone cannot create top 
programmers. 
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• Software-savvy graduates from engineering, humanities, and business departments, 
who will support the use of IT their own fields. (Again, an important source of 
innovation and entrepreneurs.) 
Different universities around the world have taken different approaches to meeting these 
divergent societal needs. Some have introduced a variety of degree programs at 
baccalaureate, masters and Ph.D. levels, some have specialized, and some have kept their 
heads in the sand. In the end, policy makers have to work with the existing institutions 
and understand their limitations. 
Alternatively, they can try to shake things up! The degree to which radical change is 
required in order to move Korea towards a leadership position in software education must 
be determined by government and academic planners. We offer here some 
recommendations for instigating radical change in the way that Korea educates software 
professionals: 
! Move forward with proposals to set up post-graduate professional software 
schools. The reorganization of software education to be more like the training of 
doctors and architects is a radical idea which has not yet been implemented 
anywhere in the world. Some Korean academics have recently proposed similar 
ideas for independent, software-focused academic organizations that incorporate 
practical training and hire faculty with industry experience in addition to world-
class researchers.51 Since we first proposed this idea in our 1999 report, we have 
elaborated some of the details, which are available in a short paper.52 
! Establish centers of excellence or magnet schools in software education. There are 
many types of software magnet programs that could be located at existing 
institutions (possibly partnered with foreign degree-granting institutions):  
• Theoretical programs aimed at researchers and future professors; 
• Intensive IIT-style programs that expose future software architects and super-
programmers to the range of modern technologies and tools; 
• Classic CS curriculum coupled with extended programming labs or work-study 
projects to give entry level programmers more exposure to practical issues like 
methodology and project management; and 
• Bridge training for university graduates with other degrees.  
! Promote competition among the major universities to create software education 
offerings of high quality. This is another radical approach requiring that existing 
institutions be made more autonomous and, at the same time, be given the 
resources necessary to create the programs needed by the software industry. 
                                                 
51 Kim, Jin Hyung, Report on Research on Computer/Software Training in Higher Education, 2002. 
52 See Barr and Tessler, Professional Software School. 2002. www.aldo.com/papers. 
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Approaches to spurring innovation in the educational institutions might include, 
for example: 
• Facilitate autonomy of Computer Science departments (with regard to student 
selection, scholarships, number of students, faculty hiring and promotion, 
research grants, endowments and fund raising, foreign students, and so on) by 
moving towards more general-purpose funding mechanisms. 
• Invite (maybe using incentives such as a land grant or facility donation) one or 
more private foreign institutions, like IIT, CMU, U. Mich., to create a private 
technical university in Korea. 
• Consider a voucher system53 where, instead of establishing admission quotas 
and annual budgets for each institution, education grants are given directly to 
students for use at the institution of their choice (if accepted for admission). 
! Separate the training of researchers and the training of professionals. Short of 
starting a professional software school, it might be possible for existing 
institutions to look at their graduate education programs differently. Most are 
oriented towards training researchers and future professors, although few 
graduates actually pursue these careers. A professional masters degree, for 
example, might be introduced, or a second track for Computer Science Ph.D.’s 
who will work in industry as software architects and innovators. At the same time, 
training of future professors should not be ignored – growth in the number of 
academic researchers and teachers is necessary to increase Korea’s capacity to 
train top software professionals. 
4.2. The Quality of Software Graduates 
Our interviews with industry, academic and government people showed a great disparity 
in opinions about the quality of software graduates. Senior technical executives at a 
number of large systems integration firms indicated that intelligence and motivation were 
more important than a Computer Science degree. 
The nature of the work of systems integrators requires fewer top-level programmers per 
project. Once someone has learned to configure an SAP installation each subsequent 
installation is more-or-less straightforward. (Computer Scientists are still needed for 
small parts of the project that are never straightforward.) All major SI firms the world 
over need to have substantial training programs for new employees (of any background) 
that cover both required technical skills and business practices specific to the company. 
From our research on US software labor force issues, we observe that the hiring and 
training practices of Korean and US systems integrators are actually quite similar.54  
                                                 
53 See discussion in West, EG. Education Vouchers In Practice And Principle: A World Survey (full report). 
World Bank, 1996. 
54 Barr & Tessler, Notes on HR Resource Issues in the Software Industry and Their Implications for 
Business and Government. Talk presented to the NSTC Presidential Advisory Committee, 1997. 
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Technical executives of software publishing firms had a quite different view of the 
quality of new graduates. They require new hires to have significantly more computer 
science skills and often some specialty knowledge, such as embedded Java programming 
or web server architecture. These organizations do not have the time or financial 
resources to train new graduates. They report that they cannot find competent graduates 
in the numbers they need and are forced to hire primarily experienced professionals; i.e. 
people with five or more years of industry experience.  
In part because of the military service exemption policies, some software venture 
companies create an R&D lab and hire one or two new graduates a year. These graduates 
are usually the very top students since they need to have the ability to work productively 
on cutting-edge projects immediately after graduation. This cream of the crop once took 
jobs at the chaebols and their SI shops. A similar migration of talent has been seen in the 
US for many years. The cutting edge software development companies recruit a large 
percentage of the top graduates, while the big consultancies and SI shops take the next 
tier of graduates. 
The real issue, as far as Korea’s software workforce goes, is to match the quantity of 
students produced at each skill level with the industry demand.55 It is important for policy 
makers to keep in mind that not all programmers are equal, and it’s not just a matter of 
learning the latest computer language. In all programming projects, whether ERP 
installations or new web infrastructure design, some very highly talented people are 
required. While non-CS majors can be successfully trained for entry-level systems 
integration, few develop into high-level software developers.  
Furthermore, all software workers need extensive hands-on programming experience 
with a variety of software tools and environments before they are proficient, much less 
expert. There are no shortcuts. While this level of training makes for a demanding 
undergraduate major compared to some others, the fact that non-CS students can get jobs 
at systems integrators does not mean that this intense level of software training in 
unnecessary for the industry as whole.  
One of the bigger complaints about the training Korean CS graduates receive in school 
has been that they do not get enough hands-on experience – they are not given enough 
non-trivial programming projects to do. Some observers believe that the reason stems 
from class sizes that are too large to allow a professor to grade a large number of 
complex programming assignments. When we compare student/professor ratios in a 
small sample of the top tier Korean schools with the larger Silicon Valley schools, we do 
see moderate differences, although nothing conclusive (See Table 3).56  
                                                 
55  Industry demand, in turn, depends on how things develop. If the software services export business 
predominates, then Korea, as has been the case in India, will need several times the number of 
programmers per export revenue dollar than if technology or software products exports predominate. 
56 Of course, student/faculty ratios tend to be lower than average class size, but it is a reasonable proxy. 
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 ROK Silicon Valley India 
University KAIST SNU Yonsei UC Berkeley SJSU Stanford IIT-Kanpur 
Department CS CS CS & IE CS & EE Math & CS CS CS 
BS Students 350 360 280 1000 1538 430 60 
MS+Ph.D 417 205 110 500 292 447 29 
Total Students 767 565 390 1500 1830 877 89 
Total Faculty 31 26 15 81 83 62 16 
Student/Faculty 
Ratio 25:1 22:1 26:1 19:1 22:1 14:1 6:1 
Table 3. Total number of faculty of all ranks (including full-time lecturers) and students (graduate 
and undergraduate) at some Korean, US, and Indian universities. All statistics are from the 
schools’ websites. 
The only really notable result is the student/faculty ratio of IIT-Kanpur, one of the two 
Indian IIT's that specialize in Computer Science. The school is known for its balance of 
Computer Science fundamentals and intensive hands-on, team-oriented training in 
modern programming. All agree that it produces superior graduates, notwithstanding its 
very poor equipment, texts and network infrastructure. At six to one, its student/professor 
ratio is approximately half of MIT's (11:1) or Stanford's (14:1), and one quarter of SNU's 
(22:1). While a low student/professor ratio is probably a significant contributor to the 
success of the school, clearly other factors play a role and must be investigated further. 
From our discussions with educators and industry employers alike, it is clear to us that a 
disparity does exist in the depth of the training of Computer Science students. Since a 
high-quality human resource is such a key factor in the development of the software 
industry. Our recommendations in the area of software education quality follow: 
! Initiate an independent, third-party assessment of the relevant departments 
(Computer Science, Software Engineering, Management Information Systems) of 
Korean universities and their graduates to identify shortfalls in curriculum, faculty 
training, and graduation requirements. Improvements based on auditor’s 
recommendations should be funded immediately. Include private sector input 
from large and small software companies in the audits and the improvement plans. 
! Expand incentives for institutions to promote interaction with industry and foreign 
research labs by students and professors in order to bring cutting-edge, practical 
software knowledge into curriculum. Several new programs have already been 
introduced to increase the amount and quality of software instruction at Korean 
schools, we offer some additional suggestions: 
• Fund continuous professional development activities by faculty (travel, 
conferences, sabbaticals, …).Encourage teachers to work in industry during 
summer breaks and sabbaticals. 
• Encourage part-time or visiting faculty from business to teach courses about 
practical technical and management issues, as well as programming labs.  
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• Schools might consider a “capstone project” requirement for graduation, at 
least as an option. At Stanford, this is a multi-month, team project of 
significant complexity. More than a few successful startups had their roots in 
these intensive projects. 
• Consider establishing co-op programs (work-study programs) at some schools. 
These programs, which are 5-year degrees, include substantial work in industry 
as part of the degree requirements. Both work-study graduates and corporate 
sponsors believe that students involved in these programs are better prepared 
for industrial positions. Temporary tax incentives for industry to employ co-op 
and summer students may help establish the practice.  
• Generally, any 5-year programs that result in joint CS Bachelors/Masters 
degree have the advantage of giving students more time to apply what they 
learn in class to advanced projects and programming work, and to learn more 
about software (e.g., project management). 
• Encourage cooperative programs for visiting professors to co-teach with 
Korean professors and do joint research (e.g. Fall in California, Spring in 
Seoul) 
! Expand current programs to supplement existing software faculty with additional 
faculty, lecturers, and teaching assistants, to bring industrial know-how into 
curriculum and to staff more hands-on programming projects for students.57 
! Integrate software education into other curricula at undergrad and MS level (both 
engineer and non-engineering majors). Industry needs people who know 
technology and can be quickly trained for specific programming jobs (e.g., at 
systems integrators). Also industry needs innovators in other fields who are 
familiar with computer technology. 
! To counteract falling enrollments in software-related fields, encourage students to 
choose software as a career and to undertake studies in Computer Science, e.g., 
with tax deferments, tuition grants/loans, PR campaigns, etc. 
! Support innovative offerings in university business programs in the areas of 
international marketing, high-tech marketing and entrepreneurship. Consider 
funding programs to increase their availability and effectiveness. 
4.3. The Demand Side of the HR Equation 
Not all the burden for improving Korea’s software workforce rests in academia. While 
we would like to see academia be more responsive to industry’s needs, it is industry’s 
responsibility to express its needs clearly. The US software industry focuses on the 
                                                 
57 Graduate student teaching assistants are particularly valuable in facilitating more hands-on programming 
projects, at the same time that these opportunities offer an important training experience to the teaching 
assistants themselves. 
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following kinds of requirements for graduates of Computer Science and related degree 
programs: 
1. Programming ability;  
2. Familiarity with wide range of current commercial software environments, tools, 
standards, and trends;  
3. Familiarity with SW development methodology and some experience with the full 
cycle of development (requirements, design, build, test, debug, trial, deploy, and 
maintain);  
4. Ability to work with teams, including your own team, other technical teams, and 
business teams;  
5. An ability to understand what users/customers are asking for and focus on their 
needs rather than just technical issues;  
6. Strong written and verbal skills;  
7. Enough familiarity with project and product management to co-develop, work 
with, or comment on technical and marketing requirements;  
8. Self-starter, entrepreneurial, requires minimal direction, and solves problems 
independently. Also desirable is domain knowledge in the employer's field or 
industry, such as finance, healthcare, or other. 
In reality, it is not at all clear that Korean employers are communicating what they want 
to see in software professionals, either to the professionals themselves or to the 
educational institutions. We undertook a small survey of software job advertisements in 
the US and the Republic of Korea. We looked at both job boards and company sites in 
two categories: software engineer and software programmer, for jobs requiring at least a 
couple of years' experience. The results, summarized in Table 4, show some interesting 
differences in the way that US and Korean firms described their needs. 
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Job Requirements US Korea
Knowledge of particular programming languages +++ +++ 
Programming experience with commercial software +++ ++ 
Familiarity with enterprise tools, environments, trends +++ ++ 
Familiarity with software development methodology +++ + 
Ability to work with teams, (technical and non-technical) +++ + 
Strong customer focus +++ + 
Strong written and verbal skills +++  
Personal essay   +++ 
Foreign language ability + +++ 
Co-develop, work with, or comment on technical and marketing requirements ++ + 
Self-starter, entrepreneurial, minimal direction +++ + 
Creative problem solver or progressive thinker +++ +++ 
Specific degree level (masters versus bachelors) ++ ++ 
Understanding of or experience in quality assurance ++ + 
Managerial ability or mentoring of younger programmers ++ + 
Experience with employer's software ++ + 
Special ability (such as artistic or musical) + + 
Age range or age limit  +++ 
Photograph  +++ 
Table 4. Comaparison of job advertisements in the US and Korea. +++ means most ads 
designate this requirement, ++, some ads, and +, only a few. 
While we cannot say this is a definitive study (we looked at some two dozen job posting 
sites and about 100 ads), some differences stand out. US employers put more emphasis 
on commercial experience and an understanding of the roles in software teams; on the 
employer’s business and customers; and on independence and job responsibility. US 
firms also appear to seek out a broader range of ages and experiences and more senior 
people (no age limit, managerial ability). The implications for both the nature of software 
careers in Korea and on communication between employers and academia are several. 
Software career paths. We note two more related points on the demand side. First, as 
we mentioned in Section 2.5, some interviewees observed that a significant number of 
programmers leave the profession in their late 20’s or early 30's. If data supports this 
assertion, then it is a serious waste of knowledge, experience, and talent that needs to be 
addressed. 
Silicon Valley software firms have developed a three-pronged career path for good 
programmers. Some become engineer team leaders and then engineering managers or 
transition into general management. A second group consists of the Ph.D.-level computer 
scientists, who in large software firms become Senior Architects or Fellows. They take 
on advanced technology projects and focus on keeping the company informed about the 
newest technical trends and innovations. 
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The third group consists of the many very good programmers who are 
neither suited for, nor interested in, management positions. In Silicon 
Valley firms, these journeyman programmers have a separate career 
path and salary structure that reflects their talent, experience, know-how, 
and familiarity with the company’s code. These experienced programmers are the key 
corporate resources who understand and sustain the software development and product 
management disciplines required in large software companies. The alternate career path 
can reward achievement appropriately throughout a lengthy career, and radically improve 
retention of senior technical professionals who would otherwise feel they have “nowhere 
left to go” in the company.  
Other labor issues. The final HR-related issue we’ll address is that smaller export-
oriented software companies experience a more adverse impact to protective labor laws 
then other types or sizes of firms. A specific concern is with regard to restrictive hiring 
and firing regulations, which do not mesh well with the dynamically changing, project-
oriented nature of software product development. In US software firms, development 
teams are formed and reformed regularly to meet competitive pressures in new product 
development. Though some team restructuring leads to worker dislocation, qualified 
software professionals can almost always find new positions elsewhere. From the point of 
view of the habitat, the movement of software people from one company to another is an 
opportunity for corporate cross-pollination of innovative thinking. While an ongoing data 
collection and analysis effort regarding these labor issues is beyond the scope of this 
report, we recommend the following: 
! Collect data on the careers of top software professionals in Korea. Encourage new 
thinking among employers about career alternatives and, generally, the 
importance of managing this resource. 
! Undertake a long-term study focused specifically on software industry labor 
issues, examining areas such as the impact of IT outsourcing on the software 
industry; performance-based compensation and promotion systems; impact of 
labor laws on both team formation and workforce mobility; and life-long learning 
policies, with the goal of accelerating change and ensuring that software export 
firms can employ globally competitive labor practices. 
4.4. The Global Supply of Software Talent 
The current slump in the worldwide software industry, and also the demographics of the 
software profession (the first pioneers are beginning to retire), means that there are a lot 
of very talented and experienced people available in the world right now. These people 
could have a dramatic impact on Korea’s professional software education, software 
startups, VC firms, certification committees, and so on. This is the time to capitalize on 
the current slow period by engaging software professionals (both Korean and non-
Korean) in various initiatives focused on Korean software technology: 
! Take advantage of the current availability of talented and experienced software 
professionals from Korea, the US, India and other countries to participate in new 
Best 
Practice
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educational initiatives, as well as innovative programs in Korean venture firm 
assistance (for example, to be visiting lecturers or as advisors to 
certification/review committees or incubators). 
! Consider the idea of establishing a specialized Silicon Valley in Seoul focused on 
mobile and wireless technologies where Korea is already a technology leader. As 
in Silicon Valley, this kind of hub would welcome a wide variety of people and 
organizations. This might be a particularly good time to attract global software 
professionals to Seoul. As in Silicon Valley, the longer-term impact of these guest 
workers would be to expand the entire Korea software industry and its habitat.  
! Draw Indian and US programmers to Korean technology, e.g. multimedia 
programming tools and wireless platforms, by offering free training. It may be 
easier to attract programmers to Korean technologies via training classes or 
conferences during this down period in the industry. They will then be primed to 
use Korean technology as the industry rebounds. 
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5. Final Thoughts 
The recommendations made in the body of this document are quite varied in terms of 
how costly they are to implement, as well as how long they might take to offer a positive 
result after implementation. Clearly, Korea must be strategic about what priorities it 
assigns to various policy changes and program funding, based on a reasonable 
articulation of its objectives over time. We offer our own vision of the timeline for 
growth of the industry, in terms of some important milestones. 
5-Year Goals 
In 5 years, Korea will have joined the Billion Dollar Club, ranking with the US, Japan, 
India, Israel, Ireland and, by then, China as a major software exporter. In addition, a few 
Korean firms will have relocated their headquarters to the US or been acquired by US 
companies, strengthening industry ties between the two countries on a new dimension. 
Among the Korean software exporters, we could see one or two widely known Korean 
brands – market share leaders in important market niches (for example, Linux security 
software, or mobile transaction processing, or wireless collaboration tools for the 
healthcare industry). Several additional potential market niche leaders should be 
identified as high-potential firms and receiving special attention. 
Several Korean VC firms should be involved in many more investments in the US (and 
maybe India, Europe, Japan and China), working with local VCs who are experienced in 
the software industry. Dozens of Korean software firms get investments from foreign VC 
firms, as a result of government efforts to encourage better venture firm transparency and 
governance practices that meet recognized international standards. 
Standard enterprise software architectures are commonplace in large and medium size 
businesses and all government and military departments. Innovative projects using 
Korean solutions and technology are underway, as a result of to KIPA’s Domestic iPark, 
changes in government procurement policies, and tax incentives for innovative corporate 
experiments. 
10-Year Goals 
Korean software exports continue to grow at double-digit rates. Korean systems 
integrators have established themselves as quality providers in several technology, 
industry, and geographical market niches (with the help of government PR and quality 
monitoring programs). Growth in the services sector may now be limited by the 
availability of talent. 
The habitat for software companies in Seoul has become a major local industry in its own 
right. Separating venture company funding for marketing and for business development, 
along with increasing the requirements for business planning on the part of the venture 
firms, has created demand for specialized support firms of all types (now established as a 
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fifth category of venture firm). A dozen venture capital firms have specialist partners 
(including successful software entrepreneurs) who understand the software industry and 
can work closely with their portfolio companies. 
A “major win” – a Korean software company will have published an enterprise software 
product at the top of a major software category (like web browsers or database 
management). In all likelihood, this market niche, whatever it is, does not exist as of 
2002. Several Korean software firms will be trading on the NASDAQ. 
As a result of the success of pioneering Korean software entrepreneurs and the rising 
prestige of the Korean software industry, top students compete to enroll in Computer 
Science majors and specialized post-graduate software training. 
20 -Year Goals 
Korean universities are world renowned for innovative methods of software education, 
attracting students from all over Asia and producing graduates that are in high demand 
globally. 
The mission of KIPA has evolved to one of long-term strategic support and promotion of 
the software industry, since its tactical programs, such as marketing boot camp, have 
been supplanted by services from a large and vibrant community of habitat support firms, 
venture capitalists, and individual advisors. Programs for startup seed funding and 
regional incubators are limited to venture firms in special circumstances, where private 
support is not available. There are no statutory distinctions necessary between high-tech 
venture firms and small startups generally. The software industry is now firmly 
established, and is a model for countries wishing to transform their nations into a similar 
knowledge economy.  
Korea’s Unique Contribution 
Eventually, Korea’s position in the software industry will depend on the development of 
technology and solutions that the world needs. National software industries, like any 
other industry, evolve uniquely from the resources and situations of each country. Israel 
got started through advanced military research, without a domestic market or a large 
software workforce. Ireland’s advantage was proximity to Europe, and India capitalized 
on decades of investment in engineering education. 
The software industry will grow in radical ways. Major new markets for software, like 
those created by the PC and by the Internet, will continue to emerge. (The factors that 
influence new software market creation continue to accelerate: new technology invention, 
decreasing hardware costs, and regional economic development.) Korea must be prepared 
to enter new markets as they emerge, in part by being a consumer as well as a producer of 
advanced technology – new ideas generally come from people and companies that have 
every-day involvement in the world’s most advanced ideas. Looking forward, beyond 
what exists, to what computing technology might make possible in the world, is the true 
key to long-term success in the software industry. 
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Appendix I. Interviewees, Information Providers & Other Sources 
This report is the product of insights we’ve gleaned from dozens of people who are 
involved in the Korean software industry and from other experts. We express our sincere 
thanks for their time and their help to all who helped us in innumerable ways. We list the 
contributors here, in alphabetical order, with apologies to anyone we’ve accidentally left 
out: 
 
Ahn, Mi Young, Venture Capitalist 
An, James, Prof., MIS Dept., Konkuk Univ., also Chairman, Korea IT Venture Incubator Assoc. 
Bae, Seok-Hee, Chairman, Mobile Standard Platform Ad Hoc Group, Telecom. Tech. Assoc. 
Bae, Zong-Tae, Prof., KAIST Grad. School of Management 
Baek, Young-Nahn, Deputy Manager, Policy Development Division, KIPA 
Byun, Wan-Soo, Director, Venture Business Support Division, KIPA 
Cho, Namjae, Prof., MIS Dept., Hanyang University (KIPA Advisory Board) 
Cho, Sun-Young, Deputy Manager, Policy Development Division, KIPA 
Cho, Yoon H., Director America Team, International Cooperation Group, KIPA 
Choe, Don, CTO/Director, Haansoft 
Choi, Jay, Executive Director, Korean IT Network, San Jose 
Choi, Key Bong, President, Borland Korea, Ltd. 
Choi, Soonpil, CEO, Chois Technology Co. Ltd. 
Dossani, Rafiq, Asia/Pacific Research Center, Stanford University 
Du, Hana, Marketing Program Manager, Oracle Korea 
Eastman, Ted S., Managing Director, International Venture Network, Monterey 
Feigenbaum, Edward A., Prof., Computer Science, Emeritus, Stanford University 
Gardner, John, Partner, Nokia Venture Partners 
Han, Tack-Don, Prof., CS Dept., Yonsei University, and CEO, ColorZip Media 
Hanna, Nagy, Lead Corporate Strategist, World Bank 
Harley, Barbara, Executive Director, International Business Incubator, San Jose 
Hoe, Han Boem, Dir. Marketing Division, Haansoft Inc. 
Huh. Moon-Haeng, VP, Digital Contents Group, KIPA 
Hur, Kyung-soon, Assistant Manager, iCommunity21 
Hyun, Jay Myung, EVP/CIO, Korea First Bank 
Im, Dae Won, EVP, Mobile C&C Co. 
Im, Kwang-Sung, Planning Manager, Chois Technology Co., Ltd. 
Jang, Doug, President, Digital Aria 
Jang, Hyoy, KTB Incubating, and Korea IT Venture Incubator Association 
Jeon, Seongmin, CEO, Tampa Internet Company 
Ji, Seok-Koo, Dir, Americas Team, International Cooperation Group, KIPA 
Johnson, Rodney, VP Global Sales, FSM Labs – RT Linux 
Kang, Bryan, IT Strategist, Digital Aria 
Kang, Ji-Young, Director, Korea Venture Capital 
Kang, Steve Sung-Mo, Dean, Baskin School of Engineering, UC Santa Cruz 
Kiem, Ted, VP, Ambex Venture Group, LLC 
Kim, Beomsool, VP, Shinwha Electronics, & Senior Vice Chair., Korea-Stanford Venture Forum 
Kim, Charles, Software Developer, Indi Systems 
Kim, Daeshik, Dir. Planning & Management Team, Korea Enterprise Dev. Incubator 
Kim, Do Hun, Electronics Section Chief, Toyota Tsusho Corporation, Seoul 
Kim, Doo-Kyoo, Director, Seoul Incubator Division, KIPA 
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Kim, Eun-Min, Director, Human Resources Planning Division, KIPA 
Kim, Gene, CFO, Haansoft 
Kim, Harry, Manager, Microsoft Korea 
Kim, Il Kon Stephan, Director, Global Business Div., Digital Contents Business Group, KIPA 
Kim, J. H., Marketing Manager, America Team, International Cooperation Group, KIPA 
Kim, Jin Hyung, Prof., CS Dept., KAIST 
Kim, Ok Kyung, Chair., Shinwha Electronics Corp. and Chair., Korea Stanford Venture Forum 
Kim, Se Kwon, Asian Technology Information Program ATIP, Seoul 
Kim, Sowoon, CEO, Zinopix Inc. 
Kim, Tae Young, Executive, Software Group, IBM Korea, Inc. 
Kim, Young-Gul, Prof., KAIST Graduate School of Management  
Kim, Young-Shin, VP, IT Human Resources Group, KIPA 
Kim, Young Tae, President, Free-ceos.com and Advisor, General Atlantic Partners 
Ko, Sung Min, President, It’s Ora! 
Kresge, Buddy, Senior Architect, BenefitsXML, Hartford 
Krishna, Srivatsa, India Administrative Service and Harvard Business School 
Lee, Bruce, Overseas Business Development, Safeland, Inc. 
Lee, Chong-Moon, Chairman, Ambex Venture Group, LLC 
Lee, Dan, President, KIPA 
Lee, Hans, President, IB Farm 
Lee, Hong Kil, Patent Attorney 
Lee, Hyun-bong, CEO, miengine 
Lee, Paul, Overseas Business Team, ColorZip 
Lee, Sang Yong, Partner, K&C BizCon (accounting firm) 
Lee, Victor, VP of Venture Capital, Asia Pacific Investment Corp. 
Lee, Yeoun Sung, Researcher, It’s Ora! 
Lee, Yillbyung, Professor of Information & Industrial Engineering, Yonsei University 
Lim, Chae-Un, Prof., Sogang Grad. School of Business (KIPA Advisory Board) 
Lim, Dong-Hyun, Seoul Incubator Division, KIPA 
Monning, William W., Dir., Commercial Diplomacy Program, Monterey Inst. of Int’l Studies 
Moon, Molly, Manager, Americas Team, International Cooperation Group, KIPA 
Morrison, Jeffrey, Chief Executive Director, iPark Silicon Valley 
Nam, Jang Woon, Dir. Research, Safeland Inc. 
Nam, Young-Ho, VP, International Cooperation Group, KIPA 
Reilly, Patrick, Founder, Silicon Valley IP Society 
Park, Chulho, Principal, SRI International, Menlo Park 
Park, John, CEO, Asia Evolution 
Park, June Sun, EVP/CTO, Samsung SDS 
Park, Kyung Kwon, Chief Director, iCommunity21 
Park, Sung-yong, Deputy Manager, Policy Development Division, KIPA 
Park, Tae Won, General Manager, Neoplux Capital 
Park, Young J., Executive Director, iPark Silicon Valley 
Rowen, Harry, Director, Asia/Pacific Research Center, Stanford University 
Shin, Pil-soon, Director, Policy Development Division, KIPA 
Shin, Sang-Hyup, Prof., Kyung Hee University (KIPA Advisory Board) 
Shrivastava, Anil, Founder, AcrossWorld Communications Inc., San Jose 
Song, Dongho, CEO, SOFTonNET, Inc. 
Song, L.K., CEO & President, KTB Incubating Corp., and Korea IT Venture Incubator Assoc. 
Song, Seok-Yun, VP, Venture Development Group, KIPA 
Tarr, Greg, Managing General Partner, GT Ventures 
Trondsen, Eilif, Research Director, SRI International, Menlo Park 
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Yeon, Kyu-Hwang, Associate Director, Gartner Consulting, Seoul 
Yoo, Han S., Sales & Mktg. Director, Insight Technologies (also, head of iPark tenants union) 
Yoon, Kwan, VP, Nokia Venture Partners 
Yoon, Sang Jin, VP Business Development, Aromasoft 
Yoon, Suk Hun, Auditor, It’s Ora! 
You, Young-Soo, CEO, Korea Enterprise Development Incubator 
Zhe, Hyoung Beom, General Director, Insung Digital Co., Ltd. 
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